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On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
The small boy who breaks a pot goes 
to tell his mother "It got broken"
Not "I broke the pot" but "It got 
broken"... And who did this? We 
did. We broke the pot.
- Flight Lt. J. J. Rawlings
Look within yourselves. All things that are, 
are lights.
- Bertrán d’en Martie
Introduction
Ghana is a low income economy. At independence in 1957 it was a middle income 
economy - with the highest GDP per capita in West Africa. The decline of the 
Ghanaian economy can be dated to 1960/61 or at the latest 1972/73 - it is 
emphatically not the result either of 1974/75 or of 1979/80 shocks albeit 
these hastened decline.
Ghana is an import strangled economy. The basic cause is levels of exports 
which are below those of 30 years ago whether measured in real volume or real 
import capacity terms and oscillated downwards from 1965 through 1983. One 
basic cause of export decline is inadequate incentives partly because of 
external terms of trade shifts but primarily from domestic ones relating to 
overvaluation of the cedi and for cocoa excessive marketing costs plus 
taxation. This factor has been reinforced by deterioration of infrastructure 
and of availability of incentive goods but these are, in origin, largely the 
result of incentive motivated export declines. Unfortunately devaluation and 
grower prices increases do not automatically or immediately reverse the 
consequential causes which now have a life of their own. Import substitution 
has been increasingly ineffective because lack of import capacity and 
distorted profit opportunities have crushed the manufacturing sector.
Ghana is a hungry economy. Food production has been on a trend rate of growth 
below population for over 25 years. This is despite increases (at least at 
retail and wholesale levels) of food prices more rapid than the CPI. 
Therefore - unlike export and industrial raw material production trends - the 
food production lag is apparently independent to a substantial degree from 
price distortions.
Ghana since 1983 (and in a broader sense since 1982) has been engaged in a 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programme. The economic policy side 
since 1983 has been relatively orthodox with one and one half caveats: the 
programme was designed to increase initial import levels (by increasing net 
resource transfers) and from 1985 raising (not lowering) both government 
revenue and expenditure relative to GDP has become a goal. On its face the 
programme is a success - the CAD is more manageable, imports have risen; GDP 
in 1984 and 1985 rose over 5$ a year; inflation fell from 140% in 1983 to 15% 
in 1985 albeit it probably reached 30% again in 19 8 6.
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Questions arise as to interpretation. 1983 was the third year of the worst 
drought in Ghana’s post 1900 history; 1984 and 1985 were climatically 
favourable. Increased import capacity presumptively would have caused some 
recovery whatever the policy package. The initial means to reducing the
government financing requirement as a percentage of GDP concentrated on
cutting real expenditure even though the base tax/GDP ratio was almost the 
lowest in the world. Similarly the deterioration of most quality of life
indicators cannot be said to be caused primarily by the stabilisation 
programme but - at least until 1985/86 - little priority was given to halting 
or reversing them.
Analysis is hampered by inadequate data - especially on composition and levels 
of household income and consumption - and by data whose margins of error and 
inconsistency seems rather high. For example, in 1985 a 1.5$ rise in food 
production and a 2.6$ growth in population were officially recorded which 
contrast very oddly, a 15$ fall in food prices and clearly greater
availability of food in both 1985 and early 198 6.
An Historical Preface
The structure of Ghana’s economy was to a large extent shaped in 1880-1914. 
Rapid growth in cocoa, gold and to a degree log production for export was the 
engine of growth. Cocoa was an African industry (small and not so smallholder 
led, using Levantine middlemen and European import export houses and - in 
practice - more hampered than helped by government policy). It was based on 
"surplus" land and labour and was the successor to smaller African rubber and 
palm oil export booms also marketed by European trading houses. Gold and 
timber were European industries using substantial European capital (including 
infrastructure), technology and middle through managerial level personnel 
combined with Ghanaian natural resources and unskilled/semi-skilled African 
labour.
The 1920s saw fairly rapid - export financed - growth including both physical 
(transportation) and human (health and education) public sector 
infrastructure. The depression and World War II halted - or reversed - growth 
with export prices (and to a degree quantities) the engine of decline in the
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1930s and shipping constraints in the 1940s.
The period from the late 1940s through 1960 was marked by renewed moderate to 
rapid growth. This was fuelled initially by rising export prices, followed by 
quantity growth (especially in timber and cocoa) and - later in the period -
by drawing on reserves built up in the 1940s and on capital inflows.
Despite relatively high tax and marketing shares, cocoa incentives at least to 
1960 were adequate to fuel an explosive rise in output from 195,000 tonnes in 
1946 to 566,000 in 1964. This record suggests rapid planting up to the late 
1950s; observers at the time believed the year in which substantial new (as 
opposed to fill-in and replacement) planting ceased was 1959 or 1960. Indeed 
arguably the incentives and output growth were too high as Ghana's share of
production was over 3 3% and the price elasticity of demand was estimated at
-0.1 to -0.4.
In 1960/61 an external balance/inflation crisis was contained. In part it was 
caused by overheating and in part by terms of trade worsening. The strategy 
of high growth by high GFCF and public service expenditure (after 1960 at the 
price of reduced personal consumption) was maintained through 1965. It was 
increasingly hampered by lagging food output, inflation (partly budgetary in 
respect to borrowing requirement levels and problematic choice of taxes, e.g. 
on transport which maximised their secondary price impact and aggravated the 
food production constraint, partly linked to the growing food supply problem), 
increasing corruption, an unduly low proportion of investment in projects with 
the possibility of high short run returns and a substantial proportion of ill 
designed, over-costly and/or grandiose projects. The post 1962 cocoa price 
slump, the cuts in personal real incomes and the attempts to cut real military 
spending precipitated a 1966 coup.
1966/69 was marked by fairly orthodox stabilisation. Within it personal 
consumption recovered, cocoa grower incentives fell, government consumption 
(except military) fell and GFCF plummeted. The 1969/72 civilian government 
sought to sustain the recovery in personal consumption, nominally at least to 
restore cocoa incentives and to return to a high GFCF/high growth path. The 
immediate cause of its collapse (i.e. first of its strategy and then of 
itself) was the continuation of a cocoa price slump until 1973* Output had 
already sunk below 400,000 tonnes (perhaps 420,000 including smuggling which
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be came significant from the late 1960s as the real official price fell below 
the real price in the Cote d'Ivoire and Togo adjusting both for transport, 
intermediary and 'lubrication' costs and the overvaluaton of Ghana's cedi vis 
a vis the CFA franc) by 1971* A scissors between low export prices and a 
fiscal position precluding massive cocoa tax cuts prevented real price 
restoration and added reduced care and increased smuggling to the medium term 
output threat posed by negligible new and limited re planting since 1960.
The 1973-1979 military regime did not have an economic policy - at least not 
in any coherent or operational sense. By the end of its life cocoa exports 
had fallen under 225,000 tonnes (perhaps 275-300,000 including smuggling). 
GDP and GFCF were on a clearly downward trend and unmaintained infrastructure 
and directly productive capacity were being eroded.
The 1979 First Rawlings government was an interim cleansing and hand-over to 
civilian rule regime. Its economic policy was anti-corruption,
anti-exploitation and populism. The 1979-81 civilian government again had no 
operational economic policy. The 1979/80 oil shock exacerbated the ongoing 
decline especially as infrastructure and public services were falling apart, 
food scarcity becoming acute and foreign resource transfers becoming 
negligible to negative.
The Second Coming (Landing) Of The Flight Lieutenant
At the end of 19 81 with the economy in total crisis and the government 
moribund, Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings returned to power, this time 
heading a mixed civilian/military government dedicated to structual changes in 
morality, production, social relations and efficiency.
Its first year in office (1982) was marked by an attempted "bootstrap" 
stabilisation programme. Real cocoa prices were raised by reducing the 
payment lag to growers from 9 months to 1 month - a critical shift given the 
near 100$ rate of inflation of previous years. Attempts at improving 
transport, external balance and fiscal balance aroused some enthusiasm but - 
given the state of infrastructure and the levels of import capacity - were 
foredoomed. Attempts to reverse public service decline were - with some 
exceptions in health - ineffective for the same reasons and because government
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wages/salaries were so low as to prevent normal workloads (assuming the
workers were to survive) and/or to enforce corruption.
Attempts to improve social relations by price controls and productive 
efficiency by fiat were more than ineffectual. They - especially the 
maintenance of an exchange rate of Cedi 2.75 to the dollar against a rate of 
30 to 40 on a price adjusted no revaluation basis - completed the already well 
advanced flight of most economic transactions from the ambit of state 
influence (and from plausible data on levels or relationships as well).
The attempted - and to a degree achieved - structural change in morality 
(anti-corruption/anti-exploitation) clearly destabilised production and 
increased risk premiums in the parallel economy. Because - if and to the
degree that it was successful - it threatened those exploiting rents it led to 
a series of coup attempts and - because of its rhetoric - to distinct coolness 
on the part of potential external sources of finance. Further, the workers 
(defence of the revolution) committees were not necessarily competent to 
identify corrupt practices, to participate in management, or to avoid dabbling 
in chopping at less as well as more proper ’fringe’ benefits themselves. On
balance they almost certainly did reduce corruption but both by mistakes and
by frightening businesses their impact on production was on balance negative.
However, 1982 almost certainly laid the foundations for acceptance of the 
1983-85 stabilisation programme by Ghanaians. The government created an image 
of honesty, concern and energy (notably lacking at least since 1972 except for 
the first Rawlings government interlude) and a certain support base among 
peasants, the bureaucratic/managerial professionals and - less firmly - urban 
workers to go with its rank and file security service support. The defence 
committees and rural development bodies in total involved up to half a million 
active participants and substantially more supporters and contributors. 
Without this base the 1983 measures could not have been implemented given the 
backdrop of externally smiled upon military and middle class coup attempts to 
oust the PNDC and, in effect, restore the status quo of 1979-81.
By late 1982 the government had concluded that "bootstrap” stabilisation - let 
alone recovery - was impossible and began serious explorations/negotiations 
toward a Fund/Bank led externally supported programme. Before examining this 
programme - which came into operation in May 1983 - it is useful to look at
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the working of the economy and the main social groups/economic actors.
The Working(?) Of The Ghanaian Economy
The basic constraints on the Ghanaian economy are import capacity and food
sector productivity.
The import constraint is most evident in respect to industry (operating
inputs, spares), public services (mobility, drugs, etc) and 
infrastructure/transport (materials, replacement equipment, vehicles, fuel). 
However, it is equally critical to all three main exports - gold, timber, 
cocoa. In the first two cases the direct import link is clear - in the last 
it relates to implements, spray and sprayers. Further, transport weaknesses 
directly related to inadequate import levels of fuel, spares, vehicles and 
road/rail/harbour maintenance (and by the late 1970s rehabilitation or
reconstruction) inputs hamper production and export in all three cases.
Food productivity is rather less effected by the import constraint. Most of 
the sector uses limited imports or import produced goods. However, transport 
does constrain areas from which output can come - physically and in terms of 
incentives since some work suggests grower food prices (private) are 25$ lower 
10 miles off a motorable road. Similarly the main North highway’s closure 
since the early 1980s adds up to 500 km to the travel distance on goods up and 
food down with evident price and fuel use implications. It is not clear - 
because of increasing cost and oligopsony margin spreads - whether or not real 
grower prices for food have kept pace with inflation especially outside the 
most accessible coastal and Ashanti region areas.
However, the basic bottleneck on food production appears to be lack of 
knowledge which has been locally tested and adapted and which is economically 
viable and user friendly. Mechanised/irrigated agriculture is a disaster, 
e.g. in rice there is probably a net forex loss and the domestic price was in 
1984 3 times import parity taken at the official rate and at least 1.5 times 
at a plausible shadow rate.
Public investment qua investment in Ghana has predominantly been complementary 
with private. It has largely been in infrastructure and/or in directly
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productive activity in which there was little actual or likely private 
activity to be crowded out. At present public investment rehabilitation of 
infrastructural, export processing, incentive (basic and amenity consumer) 
goods and agricultural tool capacity would improve forex and profit 
availability and thus encourage (and make economically useful) additional 
private sector investment.
Public sector demands on real resources may have constrained private savings 
albeit the dominant negative impact in the first half of the 1960s was to 
crowd out personal consumption and in recent years the total of public sector 
consumption and investment have been low by world, SSA and low income economy 
standards.
Public policy certainly has deterred private sector investment and encouraged 
smuggling savings out of Ghana and/or causing profits to be received 
elsewhere. In addition by reducing the levels both of economic capacity and 
capacity utilisation it has lowered actual savings levels as well as 
discouraging their investment in Ghana. As it happens these policies - e.g. 
overvalued exchange rate, high inflation with price controls and chaotic forex 
allocation - have in practice discriminated against public enterprises who 
were less able to parallel market and less oriented to using dash (gifts) to 
secure appropriate papers and obligingly blind eyes and has thus reduced their 
savings and ability to invest even more sharply than that of the private 
sector.
Forced savings" via inflation can perhaps better be termed "forced lacking",
i.e. eliminating ex ante excess demand by ex post real demand compression. By 
the 1980 Gross Fixed Investment was below reasonable depreciation estimates 
but well above domestic savings, i.e. net domestic savings were negative by at 
least 5$ and probably nearer 10% of GDP.
Corruption - a very prominent aspect of public policy over most of the period 
- clearly deterred saving and investment. First, it raised costs and 
increased risks. Second, it was unwelcome to at least some businessmen and 
would-be businessmen. Third, it diverted entrepreneurial talent into channels 
not related to raising output. Fourth, it both led to government decisions on 
bases other than public or national or normally defined political goal 
attainment and occupied a high proportion of at least a significant number of
public decision takers and public servants (?) time.
Pricing - except for public services which are fixed price at any one time 
with some shifts toward markup (including cost share) pricing - is basically 
market clearing in respect to domestic market production and imports. Margins 
are, in general, higher in services than in physical production. Cost plus 
probably sets a bottom line for most enterprise prices albeit the plus element 
cannot be taken as a constant. In late 1985 and early 1986 many manufacturer 
and retailer prices remained constant for up to 6 months (including on 
pre-devaluation stocks after a 50$ devaluation) because goods were moving far 
more slowly than anticipated and subsequent price alterations suggest some 
downward flexibility as to ’acceptable' margins. In 1984-86 wholesale prices 
grew more rapidly than retail suggesting a margin squeeze (in food as well as 
cost plus lines). There is fragmentary emphasis to suggest a similar pattern 
in producer to wholesale price movements.
The extreme case of flexprice is food where 160$ price increases in 1983 fell 
to 40$ in 1984 (negative in the second half year) and -15$ in 1985 with a 
swing from disastrous to good weather. Export prices - except cocoa - are 
determined by world prices and the exchange rate. In the case of cocoa 
government tax policy and marketing costs (about 20$ and 45$ of export 
proceeds in 1985) are additional major influences. Low prices since 1965 
resulted in low output or smuggled exports - especially for cocoa and shea 
nuts - with 1982-1986 real price increases at least partially reversing both 
output falls and smuggling.
The presence of a very large parallel (illegal) economy (especially at 
import/export and trade levels) and of a large "informal" (small scale badly 
estimated) non-agricultural sector limits effective description of 
interactions. The informal and parallel sectors have survived better than 
most large scale units (public or private) implying lower import content 
and/or more adequate access to parallel market imports. Because they are 
under-recorded, it is quite possible that the GDP decline through 1983 in 
official data is overstated. By the same token the non-agricultural 
productive and service units most able to benefit from reduction of import 
strangulation may well be medium and large scale in which case official data 
would tend to overstate the 1984-1985 recovery.
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Social Groups/Economic Actors: 1960—83
The basic social (socio economic) groups or sub-classes are:
A. Peasants
i. Tree Crop 
ii. Annual Crop
B. Wage Earners
i. Public Sector 
ii. Private Sector
C. Salariat
i. Public Sector 
ii. Private Sector
D. Informal Sector
E. Business
i. Production
ii. Commercial - Legal
iii. Commercial - Parallel
F. Armed forces
G. Foreign Finance Sources
One problem in analysis is that there are a substantial number of mixed 
incomes. Most urban households are in both the wage earning and the informal 
sectors. Further, tree crop and annual crop agriculture are complementary in 
the main tree crop areas.
Tree crop growing peasants have fared badly since the early 1960s. The rates 
of tax and administration levies on potential cocoa income has averaged well 
over 50$. Combined with overvalued exchange rates and a moderate trend 
decline in real cocoa prices the decline in purchasing power has been extreme 
- how extreme depends on one's estimate of smuggled cocoa and the percentage 
of the Ivoirienne or Togolese price growers receive from smugglers and/or
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neighbouring state middlemen. Smuggling apparently is marginal up to a real 
price differential (excluding transport and 'lubrication' costs) of say, 25$. 
Beyond that it becomes significant with the share in each region rising as the 
differential (at grower level) passes the tipping point which is higher the 
further he/she is from direct routes to the Cote d'Ivoire or Togo. 19 8 5 -8 6  
experience suggests this function operates in both directions, i.e. lower 
differentials have a prompt effect on choices between smuggling (or selling to 
the smuggling market) and using grower co-op/Cocoboard channels.
Annual crop farmers have fared somewhat better on average. However, as real 
output of food per farming household has fallen significantly (probably about 
2$ per year over 1973-83) there are likely to have been real income falls. 
Despite the fact that retail food prices have risen almost as fast as CPI, 
this probably does not hold for grower prices because of increased costs and 
decreased availability (leading to greater oligopsony power) of transport. 
However, this generalisation is subject to weather conditions by year and 
locality (1981-83 were drought years) and to location (the Northern Zone has 
fared worst).
Wage earners as of 1979 totalled about 480,000 in establishments of 10 or more 
and probably were under 450,000 by 1983- Even accepting the World Bank's 
improbably low labour force estimate (37% of population), in 1980 the formal 
wage employment total was under 12$ of the labour force - 53$ peasant
agriculture, 35$ informal.
75$ of wage employment in 1979 was public sector (roughly 40$ government, 17$ 
Cocoa Board, 18$ other public enterprises). On the face of it minimum wages 
fell to 20$ of 1970 levels in real terms and average wages to 17$ by 1983. 
The decline was greater in the public sector.
These data indicate the squeeze on wage earners but overstate. Allowances (of 
over 100 varieties) rose very sharply relative to wages over the 1970s. In 
the public sector they may have averaged \ wages in government and § in 
enterprises while in the private they often exceeded wages.
Further by 1982 hours worked in the government sector (and Cocoa Board) 
probably averaged 15 to 20 per week. Informal sector activity plus production 
for own use probably used twice as many hours and yielded an average income
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equal to wages while other household members informal sector incomes also (on 
average) probably approached wage income.
This estimate squares roughly with a very small 1983 survey in an Accra slum 
(Nima-Mamobi) which showed expenditure per household four times the minimum 
wage (and three fifths of the estimated absolute poverty line budgetary 
requirement).
The salariat (perhaps 10-15? of wage earners) have - at least in the public 
sector - fared still worse in relative real income fall terms. In the 
government the minimum wage/top salary after tax differential fell by 1985 to 
1 to 1.8. This was less true of the private sector.
However, a complicating element is that housing and - in the private sector - 
car provision (a key parallel income production asset) in kind could equal or 
exceed apparent salary. Further, managerial and bureaucratic salariat members 
had opportunities for relatively lucrative skill (e.g. doctors1 private 
practice) or job related informal - or parallel - incomes. By and large the
more honest a salariat member (and especially the more conscientious in
working full time) the worse he fared.
The informal sector consists of a small entrepreneurial minority, a large body
of petty service or craft business self employed and a significant number of 
casual or small unit self employed. On average real incomes fell -probably 
not as fast as for wage earners. However, those entrepreneurs able to fill 
production gaps or - more frequently - collect scarcity rents (including 
parallel market ones) were substantial net gainers.
The business sector performed poorly especially for large, non-financial 
enterprises and for production (as opposed to commercial) 
enterprises/capitalists more generally. The only gainers in real terms were 
rent collectors - usually in the parallel market and/or having 'bought1 access 
to scarce government allocated resources.
The armed forces fared better (i.e. saw less worsening of their real incomes - 
especially at "other ranks" level) than most social actors. Their wages 
performed little better but they received food and housing for themselves and 
their families.
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Foreign finance sources did not lose drastically over 1973-82 - except for 
investors who saw little or no formal returns remitted (informal is another 
matter) earnings remittances and their assets run down physically and in real 
value. The reason is that multilateral and bilateral aid, export credit and 
commercial lenders largely steered well clear of Ghana except in special cases 
- e.g. rural water development (bilateral), palm oil development (Ghana) and 
exports on credit prices to include risk and delayed payment elements. 
Certainly not insignificant commercial credit arrears were accumulated and 
some supplier credits were quasi-unilaterally rescheduled. However, the 
former were on transactions into which the sellers had almost certainly built 
substantial margins for possible late payment and the latter were on contracts 
which - even when no corrupt practices were involved - were usually massively 
overpriced.
Their importance as of 1982 was that without more finance - and more general 
import support useable finance in particular - no feasible rehabilitation and 
recovery and probably no feasible stabilisation scenario could be composed. 
It was the realisation of this constraint which led the PNDC (Provisional 
National Defence Council) government to alter its adjustment tactics (and 
perhaps strategy) radically in 1 9 8 3-
Distribution And Growth
In Ghana redistribution away from export crop growers - to urban areas and to 
the state - has probably worsened income distribution. Probably because the 
core of tree crop growers who produce the bulk of output still have incomes 
well above the national average. More critical it has reduced exports and 
thus import capacity and possible growth rates. Certainly in Rawlesian terms 
this redistribution was unsound.
Redistribution away from food crop growers has been less (and primarily by 
inability to raise output and secondarily by rising imperfect market grower 
price to retail price gaps as there has never been a significant state 
marketing presence in domestic foods). What there has been clearly worsens 
income distribution. Whether - given other constraints - it has radically 
reduced food production is less clear.
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Real wage falls have worsened income distribution and reduced productivity. 
While real salary falls have in fact improved urban income distribution, they 
have resulted in bleeding not only the public sector but also the economy of a 
high proportion of the skilled and professional personpower it had trained. 
For example, by 198^ 4 about 1,200 of 1 ,600 Ghanaian doctors were practising 
outside Ghana.
The 'rise' of the informal sector has clearly facilitated urban survival. 
However, much of it has low productivity in terms of personal income levels 
and - in a less warped economic context at least - negligible or negative 
national economy value.
'Legitimate' business decline has perhaps lessened inequality but that is less 
important than its negative impact on investible surplus. Parallel business 
(and associated informal sector members) have done well - worsening income 
distribution and diverting resources into channels adding little (or less than 
nothing) to national output and eroding the real incomes of the bulk of the 
labour force.
The Politics of Distribution
The political economy of distribution in Ghana has been regional as well as 
sub-class. Most notably, the tendency to overtax and underpay cocoa producers 
is not separable from the fact that main cocoa growing regions (Ashanti and 
Brong Ahafo) have been 'outsiders' in every government coalition except the 
1969/72 Busia one. Interestingly the PNDC government has shown concern for
raising real grower prices since its inception although these regions are
usually viewed as at least passively hostile to it.
The outlying regions - Northern, Upper, Western and sometimes Volta have
tended to line up against the inner (and rather economically better off) 
Eastern, Central, Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti. The Accra region (like 
Sekondi-Takoradi in the West) has been a swing area with urban informal and
organised labour (not by any means always congruent in interests or demands) 
dominant and business and professional usually (but not always) secondary in 
political influence.
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Organised labour was a factor in bringing the Nkruraah government to power. 
More consistently it has been a power in breaking governments with initial 
honeymoons followed by bitter divorces. Relative to the urban informal sector 
and the majority of the peasantry organised labour was relatively well off 
until the 1970s. Today a formal sector job (including allowances) is not 
adequate for household survival but is an assured base from which to build 
other incomes and/or a revival in real wages. Ironically although real wages 
have doubled since early 1983, the Trades Union Congress has become openly 
hostile to the PNDC government. In part this represents the fact that 1983 
levels were so low that 1987 ones still are quite inadequate for a single wage 
to support a household and in part a remarkable series of botches in handling 
allowance and wage changes. But at bottom Ghanaian organised labour still 
seems unwilling to accept the limits of the possible and the government to be 
able to make a credible exposition to labour of their nature.
The urban informal sector (excluding its elite and parallel - i.e. illegal - 
strata) has like organised labour tended to be an initial supporter of 
populist or purported populist governments (Nkrumah, Acheampong, Liman, 
Rawlings) but to subside into disillusion (rather than to campaign actively) 
against all governments with the possible exception of the Rawlings interim 
regime and perhaps the PNDC governments because it perceived that they did 
little or nothing for it.
The informal elite - especially "market mammies" have been a well organised 
pressure group effective in forcing retreats from policies hostile to them 
(including by the PNDC) and in operating effective pseudo or quasi oligopoly 
"rings". On the face of it food trading at least at retail level should be 
competitive. However, the uniformity of prices, parallel price falls late in 
the day and quantities of perishable produce regularly thrown away do tend to 
corroborate the now universal view of Ghanaians that in fact they are managed 
in an oligopsonistic manner.
The middle classes - led by professional organisations - and the now linked 
traditional (chiefly) leadership have traditionally backed conservative, 
distrusted populist and sought (notably successfully late in the 
Acheampong-Akuffo period) to organise opposition to oppressive ones. The 
difference is that the traditional leadership sub-class has in practice been
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easier to buy and/or co-opt. They have always, however, been somewhat 
fragmented and appear especially so now because the coherence, honesty and 
willingness to use professional skills of the PNDC government appeals to a 
large fraction while an equally large one distrusts its populist approach to 
income distribution and a smaller one accuses it of having sold its soul to 
the IMF.
The security forces have a chequered political history - overthrowing all 
three civilian governments, forcing changes of leadership in two military ones 
and overthrowing a third. The balance of power seems to have shifted to lower 
level commissioned officers and rank and file who are well disposed to the 
PNDC even though it is in no real sense a military government.
Business interests - as such - have not in practice been taken very seriously 
by any pre-PNDC government. Each has had, used and been used by particular 
businesses and has moved against those it believed inimical to it. After 
initial deep hostility (in part inherited from the interim Rawlings government 
and related more to overt and pervasive corrupt government official-private 
enterprise symbiosis than to any formal political economic ideology) the PNDC 
appears to be viewing enterprises (private and public, Ghanaian and foreign) 
rather more pragmatically in terms of how they might serve its goals and what 
(semi-market oriented, general, non-corrupt) policies might further such an 
effort. A tentative positive response - including the re-emergence of some 
parallel market activity into visible (and less certainly legal) channels - 
appears to have taken place on the business side.
Over 1965-1981 (and especially after 1969) government's ability to provide 
benefits - however defined or distributed - declined. Its fall in real 
resources to provide services (including payoffs) and its demonstrated 
inability to achieve economic growth or to maintain real incomes led partly to 
hostility but perhaps even more to exit from the political marketplace. Since 
1981 this deterioration has been reversed - up to a point. There is a 
partially restored belief that the government can achieve economic gains 
overall so arguments on how to distribute (bid for) them are once more live. 
Apparently (despite limited actual results to date) there is a parallel belief 
that more health and education will be provided so that bidding for these has 
also revived. While this renewed credibility is welcome in the sense of 
marking a return of more Ghanaians to participation in the politial aspects of
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civil society, it also leads to risks of unrealisable expectations and anger 
at the slowness with which gains become available to anyone. The PNDC is 
clearly being judged by higher standards than the Liman administration and may 
or may not be able to meet the new minimum acceptable performance levels.
The Development of Poverty/Survival Mechanisms
This sketch conveys the thrust of economic decline but not its full human 
dimensions. By 1982/3 about half the urban and over two thirds of the rural 
population were below the absolute poverty line - a situation worse than the 
average for low income SSA. The estimated average daily calorie intake in 
1982 was 68% of requirements.
Public service deterioration was even more marked. From an early 1970s level 
of 2 person per year visits to public sector health facilities declined to 0.7 
in 1979 and 0.4 in 1983 (and by the latter year up to half were in Christian 
Health Association of Ghana facilities).
The costs of these declines show in the Quality of Life Indicators table, e.g. 
child malnutrition, average life expectancy at birth, infant mortality. Their 
costs to present and future output should also be clear. Sick, malnourished 
people cannot work long or hard and the declining quality of education and 
high "brain drain" bode ill for future managerial, administrative and 
professional capacity levels.
The main survival mechanisms can be characterised as stabilisation 
(austerity), diversification (increasing range of income sources) and 
structural adjustment (changing basic occupation). The latter two categories 
include legal (or at least quasi legal) and parallel (illegal) variants 
sometimes both within the same household.
Stabilisation - i.e. belt tightening and doing without (including without 
belts) - has applied to 90 to 95% of all Ghanaians. This is readily 
understandable when one realises real per capita personal consumption has 
fallen over a third from its 1960 peak. Such austerity has been enforced on 
those - e.g. isolated peasant farmers - with few options and least intolerable 
for middle class Ghanaians who already had a house, car and consumer hard
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goods.
But diversification has been essential for almost all wage and salary and 
non-agricultural informal sector households. (It is prevalent in rural areas 
where additional craft or labour incomes could be found - probably affecting a 
minority of households.) As noted earlier, wages - even with allowances - 
probably cover half or less of typical wage/salary household expenditure. 
Moonlighting (virtually all informal) and perquisite misuse (taking bribes, 
selling information and stealing products) by formal sector employees and 
sending more household members (especially women and children) out to work 
longer (by both formal and informal) have been the means to diversification. 
Part of the income comes from handicraft and household own consumptioon food, 
part from food processing but most from (licit and illicit) commerce and 
bribery/theft.
Structural adjustment to new main activities is less common - and less 
commonly admitted, e.g. a university lecturer whose main household income 
comes from painting, the second largest contribution from wife's trading and 
the third largest from food gardening will still describe himself as a 
lecturer. Part of it does represent entrepreneurial creativity and socially 
useful adaptation. Much does not - e.g. the widespread smuggling, trading, 
currency and corrupt practices operations. The 'illegal' sector is either a 
small or a large one defending how one counts tens of thousands of farmers who 
smuggle on the side or sell to smugglers and scores of thousands of traders 
who operate on the maxim "if you buy parallel you must sell parallel". 
Operationally and in terms of policy targets this group of contextually 
constrained 'illegal' sector members should probably be excluded here and 
treated with other "diversifications".
What low (ex post) and middle income households have achieved is survival. 
Survival has been a remarkable achievement - but a limited one. Declines of 
up to one third in average calorie intake and re-emergence at the end of the 
1970s of two killer diseases, yellow fever and yaws eradicated in the 
mid-1950s give an empirical idea of the fall and of the human misery and death 
resulting. So does even a casual visit to urban slums or poorer rural areas.
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The Road To "Chopping Off The Backside"
Corruption and smuggling have never been absent from Ghana. But until 1966 
the latter was very low by West African standards and the former largely 
confined to a narrow circle of senior politicians and entrepreneurs. 
Corruption rose marginally - though it remained well below Nigerian levels -
through 1972 and smuggling began to become more than marginal as cedi
overvaluation and cocoa underpayment rose.
1972-79 saw corruption become generic in the officer corps and not uncommon in 
the public service with the main payers on the one hand rent seeking 
businessmen and on the other public services needing ordinary citizens. It
would have been false to state at that point that the whole public sector was
corrupted. Smuggling had risen with the steady rise of gaps in respect to 
exchange rates and cocoa prices.
1979's first Rawlings regime sought to administer a short sharp shock to rip 
corruption up by the roots. Several ex-leaders (including three ex-heads of 
state) were executed, hundreds imprisoned and/or confiscated, thousands 
affected by burning of ’’market mammy" stalls (notably at Accra’s main Makola 
market) and by forced sales at official prices. A vein of public anger was 
tapped and, for the time being, corruption was limited. However, smuggling 
and related parallel marketing were forced to hide - or to suspend operations 
temporarily - rather than halted as the economic imbalances which were their 
engine of growth were not tackled.
The Liman administrations’s major economic innovation was to achieve a system 
of generalised corruption and of generalised parallel marketing. The former 
has become known as "chopping off the backside" (from the Wescoast verb "to 
chop" literally meaning to eat but more generally to achieve an income or 
benefit by a non or illegitimate market channel). It was, and to the not 
negligible extent to which it survives is, in effect a hierarchical patronage 
system of corruption (bribery, theft, misallocation) run by senior officials 
and managers. It arose because the top corrupt or would-be corrupt 
individuals feared 1979 would come again and felt the more middle and low 
level Ghanaians they co-opted into the system the safer they would be. It was 
furthered by the continued collapse of real wages and salaries (especially in 
the public sector) which meant that extra income from somewhere was vital to
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chop literally at all. Flight Lieutenant Rawlings' angry and agonised claim 
that the Liman government had made corruption safe by corrupting the whole 
people overstates the degree of central planning involved and somewhat the 
numbers who were (are) "chopping” in one way or another but is basically a 
revealing insight into the process and its results. Smuggling became massive 
and prices even of legally imported goods were keyed to the parallel market 
because the degree of overvaluation (measured not in per cents or even 10's of 
per cents but 100's of per cents) had become ludicrously high.
Ghanaian "chopping off the backside” is a perverted relative of a mutual
obligation approach sometimes called "I'll take care of you, if you take care
of me”. Its more acceptable face is family, clan and home place loyalty and 
self help. During the recent crises years positive (for survival) adjustments 
to it included both separate households of the same family and neighbouring 
households eating together and of sending children to relatives and friends 
who had more food. (The grimmer face of the latter was "child pawning", i.e. 
selling children a family could not support as household, farm, begging ring 
or market labourers to help both the parents and siblings and the "pawns" to 
survive.) Similarly, prepared food sellers (dominantly women with small 
stalls or portable 'kitchens') carried poor informal and wage earners until 
they could pay - a method of reducing the costs of highly erratic individual
incomes by pooling via the food seller whose revenue evened out as some paid
up and others ran up debts.
The PNDC government has found fighting the widespread "chopping off the 
backside" system hard. Investigations, tribunals, firings, trials and 
sentences abound but - as Flight Lieutenant Rawlings not merely admits but 
asserts - at worst corruption is being held at bay and at best it is being 
beaten back very slowly. The Liman years did indeed build a school of minnows 
of petty corruption in which the sharks of major corruption can find cover and 
reproduce corrupt symbiotic links. This is assisted - and the PNDC hampered - 
by the continuing economic strains which force most workers into either quasi 
legal informal activity or petty parallel chopping.
Smuggling and related parallel marketing has declined. In part this may 
relate to a greater chance of detection and conviction, but largely it seems 
to flow from lessening the incentives to evade legal channels which flowed 
from massive overvaluation and underpayment. The PNDC's shift to using legal
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price signals/market mechanisms to complement improved anti-economic crime 
detection/enforcement appears to be a conscious one and to be having a measure 
of success. Certainly the large stores are now openly stocked to levels and 
ranges unknown since the late 1960s - a situation which is the result of 
parallel practices becoming less attractive in comparison to overt, legal ones 
as well as (perhaps more than) to increased physical stock and flow levels. 
The increases in visible goods clearly cannot be used in any simple sense as 
an index of welfare improvement for another reason - most Ghanaians cannot 
afford to buy them. In the late 1960s one wage earner commented that in the 
late Nkrumah period he could rarely find goods in shops but when (if) he could 
then he could afford them but that then (under the MNC) there were lots of 
goods in the shops but at prices he could not afford. While the first half of 
the comment applies not at all to the 1979-81 (Liman) period and very 
partially to the 1982 PNDC one the second half very much applies to 1985-8 6.
The Adjustment Programme
The 19 8 3 -8 5 Stabilisation/Adjustment programme was basically traditional or 
new orthodox with one exception. The exception - a deliberate immediate 
import capacity increase target (via increased concessional finance) - is in 
fact becoming standard for SSA Fund/Bank programmes.
The programme was based on an initial shock treatment - particularly in 
respect to the exchange rate - followed by sustained gradualism and supported 
by gradually increasing real resource inflows over 1983—19 8 8.
Its main elements were:
Devaluation - shock treatment in 1983 from Cedi 2.75 to 30 to the USA $ 
followed by rapid downward crawl in 1984 to Cedi 50 to the $. In 1985 for 
reasons which are not clear the downward crawl slowed sharply with the rate 
reaching only 60 to the $. (This was an unfortunate deviation as for reasons 
extraneous to the programme 1^o5 saw a once off low inflation rate as a result 
of food price falls.) This was followed by a second shock devaluation to Cedi 
90 to the $. The third shock treatment - moving to a 'dirty1 auction system 
in the second half of 1986 with a year end rate of 150 cedi per $ (vs a 
parallel rate of the order of 200) was not part of the IMF's initial or
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subsequent proposals.
Fiscal policy called for reducing the government borrowing requirement 
initially largely by expenditure cuts - an approach which seems somewhat odd 
when government spending was under 10% of GDP and the borrowing requirement 
under 3%.
Monetary policy was designed to hold domestic credit formation below 20% 
(largely by reducing government borrowing) and to achieve positive real 
interest rates to raise domestic savings. By 1985 interest rates had reached 
20%.
Cocoa prices were to be raised rapidly in real as well as nominal terms. At 
least implicitly it was assumed that this would be consistent with raising the 
net government revenue from cocoa because domestic prices and Cocoa Board 
costs would grow less rapidly than Cedi receipts would be boosted by 
devaluation. Additional foreign resources were to be mobilised from the Fund, 
the Bank and bilaterals to finance additional imports, service existing debt 
and reduce arrears.
Liberalisation included ending almost all price controls (which were virtually 
totally ineffective) and - except for cocoa, shea nuts and palm oil - all 
ceiling agricultural purchase prices (which affected a negligible proportion 
of output in 1983). It also included no questions asked licensing of "no 
forex" imports to capture the proceeds of outward smuggling for legal channels 
and to increase remittances from Ghanaians abroad (then probably of the order 
of 1,500,000 of whom 600,000 have since been repatriated by Nigeria) and to 
switch smuggled imports into channels allowing duty collection. Import 
licensing except for "no forex" imports was to be retained and made more 
efficient by systematic prioritisation.
Inflation was to be reduced sharply from the 50% to 116% rates which had 
characterised the late 1970s and early 1980s (albeit the 1982 rate had been 
22%). This was seen as possible because for most transactions - at least at 
retail level - it was believed that prices were related to the parallel 
exchange rate - not the wholly artificial official one.
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Results 1983-86
The programme's results were mixed but in its own terms basically 
satisfactory. Several weaknesss which emerged were outside the initial 
programme and raise doubts as to whether its targets were comprehenisve enough 
and its instruments (especially in respect to public expenditure) appropriate.
Price increases rose to 122$ in 1983 (145$ food and 100$ non-food) but fell to 
40$ in 1984 ( 1 1$ food and 69$ non-food) and 12$ in 1985 (-11$ food and 50$ 
non-food). A plausible preliminary 1986 estimate is 25$ (15$ food, 35$
non-food). In both 1984 and 1985 non-food prices increased by more than the 
increase in the price of forex (69$ to 60$ in 1984, 35$ to 20$ in 1985). Over 
the course of 1986 the rate rose from 60 to 150 cedis per dollar or 150$ 
although as noted the initial rise to 90 cedis had a lagged and squeezed 
effect on prices because of demand constraints and the same appears to have 
been true of the auction system related rises of the second half year.
The nature of the price change pattern bears out that most prices as of 1983 
had been closer to the parallel than the official exchange rate. However, it 
also indicates that a substantial portion (slightly over half) of 1 9 8 3’s 
accelerated inflation related to primarily weather induced food price rises 
and the bulk of the subsequent fall to weather related food price 
stabilisation. Thus the positive real interest rates achieved in 1985 were 
lost in 1986 and the question of whether inflationary expectations nave 
changed in a way that can eliminate inertial inflation remains open.
Money supply increases were low. Government bank borrowing requirements fell. 
Enterprise credit demand remained low and banks proved unwilling to expand 
credit to most of them. As a result banks began to refuse savings and time 
deposits creating a somewhat artificial stability (and presumably forcing 
velocity up, especially in 1983)• Rather oddly it would appear that lower 
interest rates and/or less artifactual criteria for lending to enterprises 
would have increased monetised savings. They would also have tended to limit 
the tendency to transform money into non-perishable consumer goods and thus 
presumably modestly reduced inflation.
By the second half of 1986 the somewhat artificial liquidity problem had 
become acute. Banks were unable to extend enough credit or to mobilise enough
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currency for all viable enterprises to meet the conditions of the forex 
auction. The basic reason, now somewhat ironically, was the artificial 
curtailment of deposit (especially interest bearing deposit) levels which 
might be supposed to be counter-productive with enhanced loan demand from a 
growing number of firms with plausible cash flow and profit and loss 
positions.
GDP rose 7.656 in 1984, 5*356 in 1985 and 5.656 in 1986 - the first time per 
capita GDP had risen in three consecutive years since the 1950s. In 1986 it 
probably was above population growth (2 .656) and possibly 456 or better. This 
growth was fairly widely distributed sectorally albeit the high 1984 level 
relates in large part to weather related food crop harvest recovery.
Exports fell sharply from $641 million in 1982 (and $1,104 million in 1980)to 
$441 in 1983 partly on volume decline related to weather and continuing 
infrastructure deterioration and partly to price changes. The 1984 recovery 
to $566 million was dominated by favourable price changes but those of 1985 to 
$632 million and 1986 to $773 million did reflect substantial output increases 
albeit in 1986 the gold price rose significantly.
Public services provision was badly hit by budgetary curtailment in 1983 as 
was public infrastructural investment. The ratio of budgetary spending to GDP 
fell to about 6 .556 (5.556 recurrent and 156 capital) and of revenue to 5.456. 
Further, the control method used of centralised, specific releases of funds 
for a wide range of items while effective in curtailing expenditure also 
curtails its efficiency.
The overemployment/underemployment problem has yet to be tackled squarely. 
The complementary resources available are at most adequate to justify half the 
present public service and Cocoboard establishment - who on average are in 
fact working half time or less, a situation enforced by present pay levels. 
1985/86 attempts to raise minimum wages 3056, decompress after tax 
differentials from 1 to 1.8 to 1 to 5 and to rationalise/increase government 
(and reduce public enterprise) allowances within a 3056 pay-roll boost have 
created an impression of total confusion, a discrepancy in the Budget probably 
of the order of $100 million and very considerable worker resentment.
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In the most overstaffed parastatal - the Cocoa Board - employment at 89,000 to
110,000 (depending on coverage) could sensibly be cut not by 16,000 as 
proposed and probably achieved but to 16,000 (or perhaps 25,000 including 
certain related activities). To do so is critical to raising the growers' 
share in export proceeds without creating fiscal havoc. But such cuts are 
only possible if replanting and field staff laid off can be allocated 
replanted or replantable areas and assisted in becoming cocoa (or other crop) 
farmers. It is by no means self evident this could not be done but given the 
probable short run political cost and the illusory nature of the Ministry of 
Agriculture's service delivery and programmatic capacity the chances of such 
an exercise are problematic even though first steps have been taken and more 
are scheduled.
The need to raise - not lower - the Budget/GDP ratio is now recognised and 
indeed it has recovered to about 12% (9% recurrent, 3% capital) on expenditure 
and 9% on revenue side and rehabilitation programmes for education and health 
are at pledging conference stage. Revenue raising priorities however appear 
odd as well as raising problems for the access of poor people and vulnerable 
groups. While a remarkable number of low unit value, high administrative cost 
fees are being introduced sale and excise taxes with few exceptions remain 
derisory (1.5% on schnapps, 0.5% on soap as a proportion of retail price) 
partly at least because old specific rates have been raised - rather than 
converted to ad valorem scales at plausible levels - with no apparent 
realisation how derisory inflation had rendered their base levels.
Fixed capital formation is now prioritised to rehabilitation and bottleneck 
breaking albeit some project priorities appear odd - e.g. a low traffic new 
highway from Accra to the Cote d'Ivoire border while the main north highway 
remains out. In 1987 $65 million was at last allocated to the Great North 
Road from Kumasi through Ejura, Tamale and Navongo to the Burkina Faso border 
but only after several hundred million had already been earmarked elsewhere.
In this case EEC (and ECA) commitment to promoting regional cooperation 
clearly resulted in a spurious priority being given but Ghana should have 
developed and stuck to a systematic highway reconstruction and upgrading 
priority list. However, its absolute level appears dangerously low when 
compared to plausible depreciation estimates. Net fixed capital formation was 
0.5% in 1982 on what was even then a rather low depreciation estimate. It has 
risen to 5.4% in 1985 largely because the depreciation rate has been halved -
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otherwise it would be 2.0$ (and on depreciation/capital stock procedures 
comparable to those used in a study of Zimbabwe it would be negative). The 
domestic savings rate remains low - perhaps 6$ gross in 1985, but virtually 
certainly negative at net level.
Causal Relationships
Joan Robinson once remarked that if one cast incantations (curses) on sheep 
and dusted their pastures with arsenic there would be a high correlation 
between incantations and sheep mortality. Given the brief period since 
stabilisation and recovery began in Ghana the inverse problem of separating 
incantations (propritiatory) and improved pasture arises.
1983 results were affected by the worst drought in Ghana's history and 1984 
through 1986 by three years of above average rainfall. Import recovery via 
external resource transfers rising at gross level from $237 million in 1982 to 
$575 million in 1983? $514 million in 1984 and $543 million in 1985 and $469 
million in 1986 clearly would have allowed increased output almost independent 
of particular policy choices. However, these funds could not have been secured 
except for the adoption and continuation of the Stabilisation/Adjustment 
Programme. Given the 1966—1983 (or as the external financial sources saw it 
1957-1983) record, the Ghana government had very limited credibility for 
bargaining on the parameters of the programme and given the chaotic and 
disintegrating state of the economy it also had little time to seek to 
negotiate alterations.
The extent of import increases can be overestimated. 19 81 levels (a 
desperate, unsustainable attempt of the dying Liman regime to hang on) have 
never been regained and much of the additional finance has gone to make 
1982-83 levels sustainable, to reduce arrears or to service debt rather than 
to boost imports directly.
1982 imports of $631 million declined to $500 million in 198 3 before 
recovering to $616 million in 1984, $726 million in 1985 and $780 million in 
1986. Even the 1984 and 1985 increases are higher at apparent than real level 
as some formerly smuggled imports have returned to "no forex" and other 
official channels. Indeed imports are not projected to regain their official
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nominal price 1979-81 average of $925 million until 1988. Therefore it is 
hard to argue that better overall economic management has been irrelevant to 
or insignificant in 1984/85 recovery.
While 1983-85 was marked by more centrally allocated imports, the quality of 
allocation was very patchy. Key imports - e.g. steel for agricultural 
implements, the drug import counterpart of the approved health budget - have 
not been given priority while non-priority list amenity goods have been 
imported. Somewhat ironically the World Bank temporarily emerged as the 
champion of a tough, prioritised, centrally operated forex/import licence 
allocation system. It also - as a third best presumably - begun to stress the 
need for sectoral import support aid with uses tied to Ghana government stated 
priorities which have to date gone missing in the allocation process.
The 1986 auction system took most enterprise sector import outside the 
allocation system which applied only to government and a handful of general 
input (e.g. petroleum) imports. While there have been limits on approved 
uses, so that through mid-1987 there was probably little bias against producer 
goods.
In 1987 the auction system prices were applied to all transactions including 
petroleum imports, debt service and cocoa exports. More startlingly plans 
were announced to remove nealy all restrictions on current account uses 
(including consumer goods with a limited exception list, dividends and 
business expenses) de facto dismantling import licensing and current account 
exchange control. The first tranche (covering 40% of consumer imports) is to 
be in place by early 1988 and the liberalisation completed by 1989. These 
moves are clearly World Bank instituted and are presumably trigger clauses for 
its programme aid (which is critical to the auction).
Their impact on manufacturing is likely to be negative even if a coherent 
tariff system is in place by 1988. While perhaps 60$ of Ghanaian 
manufacturing capacity is competitive and another 20$ may be (estimates not 
very dissimilar from the Bank's) that assumes rehabilitation of plant, access 
to operating inputs and time at moderate to high capacity utilisation to 
restore financial viablility. These conditions cannot be met by 1988 or 1989 
and - given demand patterns and experience with other SSA auctions - there is 
every likelihood of a severe squeeze on operating goods imports. Quite
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substantial actual de-industrialisation and even more blocking of 
re-industrialisation appears likely.
However, the 1985 cocoa export recovery and the 1985/86 crop purchases 
increase of over ¿J0% on the 1982/83 low clearly owe much to the lagged results 
of 1982-85 cocoa price increases as does the reappearance of shea nuts as a 
’visible' export. The explosive recovery of timber exports from $12.3 million 
in 1982 to $30 million in 1985 and an estimated $60 million in 1986 was made 
possible by programme loans made under the programme combined with the price 
incentives given by devaluation, and the same can be said of the halt in gold 
output decline albeit still at levels 10% below 1982 in 1985.
The defects (or disasters) of results in respect to basic services, investment 
and protection of vulnerable groups are equally not fully causally related to 
the programme. In the first place continuation of 1973-81 non-policies or
1982's "bootstrap" attempt would have produced worse results. In the second, 
there has been substantial and fairly prompt revision in respect to basic 
services albeit less evidently in relation to vulnerable groups or net
investment levels.
However, the initial approach to the Budget of cutting expenditure rather than 
raising revenue was clearly unsound and the particular methods of cutting used 
probably reduced the effectiveness of expenditure.
Selected Problem Areas
Cocoa is a central problem area in several senses. No reliable effective
hectarage (excluding moribund areas and adjusting thin stands by some standard 
trees per hectare formula), yield per hectare, production, smuggling or
replanting figures exist. The present policy and projections astoundingly 
treat output as identical to official purchases. As 1982 smuggling was 
probably in the 50,000 to 75,000 tonne range and the 157,000 to 225,000 tonne 
official purchase recovery over 1982/83-1985/86 may well be about 1 / 3  weather, 
1/3 clawed back smuggling and 1/3 higher production proper (from better care 
and/or greater availability of machetes, spray and sprayers) to elide output 
and official purchases seems unsound.
-28-
The lack of data on replanting (not least to filling in gaps in existing 
bearing farms) - known to have been very low over 19 6 0 -8 0 but recovering at 
least in 1984-1986 - makes output projections highly tentative.
A broader problem arises with 300,000 to 350,000 tonne targets. Over 
1971—1982 primary exports of cocoa fluctuated around a level of about
1.100.000 tonnes starting and ending at 1,184,000 and 1,187,000. Even 
including pre-export processed products (a growing share in most cocoa 
producers including Ghana), world demand growth at constant prices appears to 
be no higher than 2$. With price elasticities of the order of . 1 5  to .20 
short term and .3 medium to long, the implications of sharp production 
increases are only too clear. If Ghana raised exports from 150,000 to 300,000 
tonnes this would boost global supply by 10$. Malaysia's explosive rise from
24.000 tonnes in 1979 to over 10 0 ,0 0 0 today and a 1990 target of 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 based 
on trees already planted adds another 7$. If half of the Ghanaian increase 
was full clawback of smuggling the impact would be less severe, but on any 
view cocoa price prospects for the rest of the decade do not look promising.
Indeed if one takes Ghanaian (150,000), Malaysian (over 100,000), Ivoirienne 
(over 150,000), Nigerian (at least 50,000) and other producer (at least 
50,000) 19 8 5 -9 0 output projections seriously it is necessary to project an
impending cocoa market disaster (not price increases as projected by the Cote 
d'Ivoire or approximate stability as posited by Ghana and apparently the World 
Bank). These increases total over 500,000 tonnes (over 3 3$) when the record 
suggests that over 5 years at most 10 0 ,0 0 0 tonnes (6.2 /3$) can be absorbed at 
constant real prices. At a -0.2 short term price elasticity, the price on the 
2 6 .1 /3$ 'excess' supply increase would actually fall below zero.
Clearly the elasticity would not remain constant over that range nor would all 
the output rises materialise in the face of radical price falls. However, the 
International Cocoa Agreement seems virtually certain to be unable to defend 
its new (lowered) floor price for longer than 12 months with a subsequent free 
fall until some output is squeezed out quite likely thereafter. Unfortunately 
Ghana's overall financial position is such that it can hardly expect to be 
able to sustain production (however economically efficient and however absent 
the export alternatives) if Malaysia, the Cote d'Ivoire, the Cameroon and 
Brazil decide to use interim subsidies to ensure the survival of their sectors 
at or near projected levels.
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Rehabilitation and expansion of the cocoa processing plants (cocoa butter, 
powder and paste) probably merits more attention than it has received. The 
process adds substantial value added without increasing pressure on prices and 
if modernised/restored to full capacity the plants should at least break even.
Exports more broadly pose problems. To build a base for moderate growth - 
including capacity rehabilitation and utilisation and investment in structural 
adjustment - without exceptional finance requires a once for all doubling of 
exports and a subsequent 5$ a year growth path.
Over 90$ of exports come from timber and products, gold , manganese, diamonds, 
cocoa and cocoa products with the last accounting for 25$. Doubling the 
exports of the non-cocoa group over 5 to 7 years and thereafter maintaining 5$ 
growth may be just feasible if logs are increasingly substituted for by sawn 
timber, plywood and veneer and manganese ore by ferro manganese. Even with a 
massive increase in pre-export processing it is very hard to see how the value 
of cocoa exports can be doubled, let alone kept growing 5$ a year thereafter.
Other exports (under 10$) include shea nuts (a non-irritating oilseed with a 
growing specialty soap, baby oil and vegetable oil demand) and palm oil. In 
the case of the former - largely gathered not planted or tended - agricultural 
changes are needed if supply is to rise; in that of the latter rapidly rising 
output is generating a surplus but at a breakeven fob price double the 
Malaysian crushed world price. Beyond that some pre-export processing 
opportunities (beyond timber, cocoa, manganese) exist, e.g. hides and skins, 
palm oil (to soap or margarine), gold (smelting and perhaps jewellery).
Similarly, backward integration from electricity (the Valeo smelter) to
bauxite/alumina may be viable for Ghana despite world excess capacity in
bauxite mining and alumina processing.
Manufactured export potential - e.g. in textiles and garments if cotton
production can be rebuilt - is problematic. It depends on finding specialty 
niches in the world market (e.g. specialty prints and garments) and 
reactivating ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States sometimes 
unkindly called "The Echo Was").
Very little serious work, taxonomic or targeted, production or promotion
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oriented has been done beyond raw cocoa, logs and sem-refined gold. As these 
demonstrably cannot carry the load by themselves this would appear to be a 
serious gap. This gap is common to virtually all SSA Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, notably to those of Zambia and Tanzania.
One factor contributing to the lack of coherent, articulated export 
development strategies in SAP's is a belief that with right forex prices 
exports will follow. However, that is unlikely to be the whole explanation. 
The Bank has come to realise that adequate export recovery (measured in terms 
of earned import capacity) for SSA as a whole and for most individual 
countries cannot be achieved solely via existing primary product exports. It 
also recognises that under actual projected market conditions diversification 
of any large SSA economy into the major exports of other SSA countries is 
likely to rob Peter to pay Paul (i.e. at continental level to suffer from the 
fallacy of composition). However, it has also lost faith in any early 
manufactured export breakthroughs (partly because despite the evidence of, 
e.g. Brazil and South Korea, it seems still to assume these must follow the 
dismantling of tight protectionism) and has an intuitive (since based on 
little empirical testing) distrust of pre-export processing. Thus the Bank - 
and the Ghana government - tend to concentrate on main existing exports' 
recovery or expansion even though knowing this is manifestly a partial and 
potentially a very risky 'solution'.
Agricultural policy, services, research and data outside cocoa are uneven and
in general weak. No coherent strategy nor set of priorities exists. Of the
three stated priorities, one - cassava disease control - appears unnecessary,
one - mechanised rice farming - highly undesirable, one - maize - useful but
arguably less urgent than millet, guinea corn and yams which are crucial to 
food security and cash income in the Northern and Upper Regions which are 
starved for both.
Input supply (especially hand tools, cocoa sprayers and spray and improved 
seed) requires strengthening. Transport rehabilitation requires main highway 
reconstruction (especially Kumasi-Manpong-Ejura-Tamale) as much as feeder road 
and track building (much of which can be, and an increasing volume of which is 
being, done on a community basis). A coherent research and extension 
programme linked both to adaptation and testing and to learning from farmers 
is needed. Data is at present inconsistent and incoherent, anarchic
-31-
non-communication and immobility appears a greater problem than 
overcentralisation, e.g. the one functioning regional programme Voradep 
(Volta) is not only nearly independent of the Ministry but much of its work is 
not consciously known there much less to other regions.
If rural income raising - especially of poor farmers - is a serious goal it 
needs to be integrated into policy. The crop priorities (beyond cocoa and
palm oil) would appear to be guinea corn (sorghum), millet, small scale labour
intensive rice, cocoyams, yams, plantains, groundnuts, cotton, tobacco, 
coconut (if varieties resistant to Cape St. Paul wilt can be bred) and shea 
nut (developing farming - as opposed to gathering - techniques).
For most farmers the main cash crop is a food crop (a fortiori for most women 
farmers and most poor farmers). In the Northern and Upper Region the paradox 
of a food trade surplus (yams, groundnuts and grain to the South and Burkina, 
cattle to the South) and the worst nutritional levels in Ghana has two 
explanations. The only way to meet cash needs is to sell food even if initial 
production levels were alrady inadequate to meet household needs. And the 
collapse (from depressed controlled prices) of cotton and tobacco which were 
moderately complementary in production with staple foods and provided 
alternate cash income sources has increased pressures to sell food. The
1985/86 transfer of cotton procurement to an oil milling/cloth producing 
consortium and of tobacco procuring to the cigarette company should have a 
positive impact in this context. Facing high import costs for inputs (or lack 
of licenses) and unsatisfied local demand together with substantial unused 
capacity, these users do have a medium term incentive to raise the grower
price and certainly to get out and buy. The evident need to safeguard growers 
against their oligopsonistic interests in holding grower prices down is a 
medium to long term future, not a present one.
Labour and wages pose a set of interlocking problems with which the PNDC has 
been grappling with decreasing success. Despite the fact that real wages and 
real cocoa prices have risen, the combination of trade union militancy for an 
early return at least to 1977 and a highly accident prone 19 8 5 -8 6 set of 
contradictory initiatives by the Ministry of Finance have created serious 
government/trade union conflicts. Given the TUC's role as government 
underminer these have to be taken seriously.
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Real wages are too low to be efficient. Nobody can afford to give a full 
day's work because nobody receives a full day's pay. Like farmers, wage 
earners do respond to incentives, not least to negative ones.
Too high a proportion of wage and salary income are allowances and these are 
too fragmented, unequal and peculiar. There is, inter alia, a near total loss 
of transparency, a systematic underpaying of the government sector and a 
serious erosion (in fact if not in law) of the tax base.
Government differentials (after income tax) of 1 to 1.8 as of 1985 were far 
too low to provide incentives or to retain adequate skilled, artisanal and 
professional cadres. Given the falling private sector employment the exit 
options were abroad and into informal self employment. This has also 
distorted career choices as illustrated by two examples. A driver still is 
proud that his son is about to win his way to university and hopes he will 
become a lecturer. A lecturer tells his son not to bother with forms 5 and 6, 
let alone university, but to become a self employed electrician via informal 
apprenticeship and learning on the job.
There is no way all government employees can be paid a living wage and 
provided with adequate supporting inputs (e.g mobility, tools, working 
materials whether pump spares, seeds, texts or typweriters with paper) in the 
foreseeable future. The Cocoa Board is the epitome of this with 'employment' 
comparable to the entire private enterprise sector.
Over 19 8 5 /8 6 the government announced:
a. a 50$ minimum wage increase;
b. a widening of the government differential to 1 to 5;
c. reduction of parastatal allowances to government sale;
d. initiation, cancellation and - in the face of an outcry - restoration of
a government service annual home leave allowance of 20$ of base pay;
e. ending parastatal operating subsidies by 1987 with higher charges or 
lower employment to close the gap (which led inter alia to 500 to 600$
postal rate increases from ludricous to plausible levels spearheaded by 
workers' committees when the management showed no sign of knowing how to 
increase receipts!);
f. cutting (apparently marginally and in unspecified ways with promised but 
unspecified 'redeployment') of government and Cocoboard employment beyond 
cuts already achieved by dropping "ghosts" from the payroll;
g. holding the government employment bill growth in 1986 to 30%.
As is - or ought to have been - self evident the Budget target was not 
consistent with the pay and allowance changes - possibly by as much as Cedi 
8-9 billion ($90-100 million at that time). Overall the Budget did stay 
within borrowing targets and indeed below estimates but only at the price of 
draconic cuts in non-wage and salary recurrent spending below actuals. 
Further, the threatened cuts in public enterprise allowances, the spectre of 
large scale redundancies and the too-ing and fro-ing on the (patently ill 
thought out) leave allowance, have alienated workers, ignored specific case by 
case realities and created an aura of indecision and incoherence (intriguingly 
more in respect of Finance than of Labour). What they have not done is 
provide a strategy for resolving any of the major formal employment sector 
conundrums.
Budget strategy and management increasingly appear to be problematic areas 
rather than pillars of strength. The initial reduction of government spending 
is now perceived as an error and has been reversed but its costs in nearly 
detroying government health services and gravely undermining education, 
transport and works and agriculture remain.
Expenditure control is effective at keeping within estimates primarily by 
releasing most items included in the Budget only on a case by case, need 
proven, funds available, cleared at top Treasury level basis. Unfortunately 
this also tends to slow down and in part paralyse an already weak and slow 
moving government system. Indeed it may not actually hold expenditure down as 
well as it appears to do. The level of upaid bills is high - twice annual 
development vote in one case which may not be atypical - and appears to be 
rising. The cost is high - e.g. because of unsettled clearing and forwarding 
charges the average time needed to secure release of government drug imports
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was as of 1986, 14 months.
The Budgetary process has broken down. The last detailed actual expenditure 
data are for 1977/78. More recent estimates are very shaky, inadequately 
broken down and so suspect they are little used in the Treasury and nearly 
unknown to operating Ministries. The non-wage share is so low (6% of total 
recurrent for education and 8% of decade earlier real per capita levels for 
health in 1986 to give two examples based on estimates which probably 
overstate actuals) that the resource use cannot be efficient. Nor can a 
process of basically Treasury articulated targets (with weak Ministerial 
inputs); no releases except for wages and salaries and some Treasury selected 
payments of back bills until the Budget is promulgated 2 to 4 months after the 
start of the fiscal year; no certainty most non-salary allocations in budget 
will in fact ever be released nor if so when; inadequate and decentralised 
accounting making Ministries de facto unable to tell what their actual 
disbursements and unpaid bills let alone commitments are. In normal terms 
this is not a budgetary process at all; cannot help but lead to inefficient 
use of the resources made available; prevents coherent ministerial annual (let 
alone forward) planning and pretty effectively removes any basis for holding 
Ministries accountable for expenditure levels of efficiency. While 1987 
announcements indicate an intent to reform (oddly apparently primarily by 
juggling institutional patterns) with Bank technical support they do not give 
much of a clue as to how fully the disintegration of the budgetary process 
(dating to the late 1970s but still - if anything - worsening) is recognised.
Revenue base reform has been real but uneven. The continued dependence on 
cocoa export taxes (Cocoboard surpluses) hardly helps restore incentives to 
growers. It results from very low effective indirect taxes on local products 
other than beer, cigarettes and petroleum products. In large part this 
relates to continued use of archaic specific rates, e.g. a tripling of the 
excise on schnapps (the basic spirit) in 1986 raised it to 1.556 of the retail 
price while on soap a 6056 boost took it to 0.5/6. The old exemption of 
exciseable goods from the 'general* 1056 sales tax on ex-factory price was made 
because the excise was then higher, after the late 1970s it protected a highly 
preferential, revenue eroding set of rates until minor excises were abolished 
in 1987 but with alcohol remaining undertaxed and both import duty and 
registration tax on most saloon cars abolished.
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Reform of indirect taxes (and consolidating allowances with wages and salaries 
for income tax purposes) would yield more revenue at less cost than recent 
attempts to collect fees on millions of small charge transactions. On purely 
administrative efficiency grounds several - e.g. monthly standpipe user 
household water charges, fees for oral rehydration salts - appear to be 
nightmares likely to open new avenues of corruption and strain on already 
overburdened and lagging accounting systems (as the designated collection 
agencies who were not consulted in advance agree) quite apart from the fact 
that similar revenue from taxing consumer manufactures in general and alcohol 
in particular would seem to have distinct equity advantages.
Basic services - health, education, water - are now receiving attention with 
at least some priority to basic sub-sectors (e.g. immunisation and primary 
health care, primary and skills education, rural water). However, to fund
these solely out of incremental resources (without major tax reform) will
prove a slow process. In health closing derelict hospitals and redeploying 
their staff and resources could achieve more rapid results. Similarly, 
substitution for most of the new fees of community or neighbourhood cost 
sharing (e.g. in food, labour, materials, maintenance, communal collection of 
pump servicing fees to be paid when/if serviced) could probably further
participation, reduce access problems for poor people and raise more resources
than individual fees at basic services level. In addition, higher piped water 
charges to cross-subsidise standpipes would appear administratively, 
financially and equitably superior to standpipe user charges.
More generally the poor and the vulnerable while clearly of concern to the 
PNDC at higher levels albeit perhaps less so to the Ministry of Finance are 
not the beneficiaries of specific, targetted programme attention. Raising 
agricultural production in poor areas, assisting (by credit or technical 
assistance) informal sector production, food security, etc., have not been 
seriously addressed. Indeed, as noted, actual agricultural policy is biased 
against poor regions and farmers while the fee emphasis in fiscal policy seems 
likely to reduce their access to basic services in contrast to alternative 
financing routes.
This is emphatically not to argue that the decline in basic service access and 
rise in absolute proverty are the result of the stabilisation and adjustment 
programme. For that the primary blame must rest on 1966—19 81 economic policy
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and especially on 1972-1981 non-policy, and secondary on 1974-75 and 1979-81 
external shock with the 1981-1983 drought cycle responsible for their post
1981 crises. Poor people in Ghana would certainly not have been better off 
had the 1979-1981 drift continued nor had the PNDC refused to negotiate a
stabilisation/adjustment programme acceptable to the Fund and Bank and
persevered in a purely bootstrap approach.
Nor is it self evident that the programme itself has harmed them. What is 
evident is that - quite needlessly - practicable vulnerable group and poor
person protection targets in respect to health and education access, nutrition 
and agricultural production possibilities were not built into the programme in 
1983 or 1984 and only very partially since. Even in short term economic and 
incentive and production terms this was, and is, probably shortsighted. In 
the medium term it will be a drag both on economic recovery and on social and 
political stability. The fault cannot be laid solely at the door of the Fund,
the Bank and the bilaterals. The Bank and some of the bilaterals, indeed,
seem to have spotted some of the gaps and possible ways to overcome them 
rather more quickly than some Ghanaian Ministries (e.g. Agriculture and 
Finance).
Prospects: Adjustment Fatigue, Expectations, Imports
Ghana is suffering from adjustment fatigue. The exhileration of the 1984 
initial recovery appears to be wearing off, the expectation of high short term 
gains (especially by wage employees) is rising and the ability of the 
government to avoid damaging conflicts or cave-ins (as exemplified by the 
confused noises on public sector allowances, the unclosed budetary data and 
the astounding mid-1986 assertion - apparently intended for donor ears only - 
that the economy was dead in the water apparently leading to the forex auction 
as a face saving device) is waning.
Indeed 1986 appears to have been a year of overkill on the demand side. 
Despite 5 -1 % GDP growth personal consumption appears to have risen by less 
than - i.e. it fell 2% or more per capita. This surely explains the lower 
than independently forecast (25Í vs 3350 inflation, the retail and probably 
wholesale margin squeeze, the ability to manage the auction to avoid erratic
swings or downward overshoots. Together with tight credit it explains the low
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response of most elements of private investment to sustained growth. As real 
wages (especially in the dominant public sector) and real cocoa incomes (on 
real price and output swings) rose, food farmers and the informal sector 
(including literally scores of thousands of small retail traders) must have 
been squeezed on both income and consumption.
At the same time most Ghanaians are better off than in 19 81 - let alone 1983 - 
and so perceive themselves. In rural areas there is a dynamic of community 
organisation/mobilisation which is having a not insignificant impact on public 
service provision and which implies that incomes of many are above subsistence 
levels.
Continuation of 5 to 61 growth - with rising rates of government recurrent 
spending and of domestic savings to GDP and a 3% population increase - will 
not allow much growth in real per capita consumption. While radically better 
than the 1972-1982 trend a growth of per capita real consumption of 1 % or less 
in line with Ghana and Bank 1986-95 projections a year may not be consistent 
with social stability.
But even a 6% to 656 medium term growth rate is far from assured. It depends 
on no new drought cycle beginning before 1989, on a total break with the 
1960-1982 food production trend and on no or minor net terms of trade losses.
Even if one accepts that each has a .6 probablility that implies .3 6
probablility of meeting both tests.
Similarly, the requisite external resource transfer and export earnings levels 
are by no means assured. For 1988 and 1989 about 25% of the gross resource
transfers are identified pnlt by assuming redrawing of most IMF repayments.
While export quantity projections may be attainable despite averaging 16% a 
year if gold and timber recovery can be prevented from sliding further behind 
schedule and more smuggled cocoa can be clawed back into visibility, the value 
figures are highly doubtful (barring a gold price boom). Cocoa prices fell in 
1985, are falling in 1986 and can be expected to fall further - especially if 
Ghana production rises significantly. In 1986 an export value shortfall was 
clawed back by the fall in oil prices (one country’s supply shock is another’s 
windfall gain) but the prospects for such deii ex machinae in 1987 and 1988 do 
not look too promising.
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These problems are compounded by distribution issues. For productivity as 
well as human conditions reasons, rehabilitation of health (primary health
care) and of education as well as creation of relevant agricultural services 
are a priority. This will require tax reform - esepcially through raising 
indirect taxes. Labour, especially in the public sector is paid at rates
below those necessary for efficiency or labour peace and while retrenching 30
to 50$ of the government and Cocoa Board employees and paying the same total 
wages/salaries might well raise public sector output, it would hardly be 
conducive to social stability or to avoiding labour unrest seriously damaging 
to productivity and to expectations unless very substantial self employment at 
plausible income levels can be generated by targetted, funded government 
backed programmes which do not now exist even at conceptual level. Further 
there is a growing awareness that the Northern and Upper Regions are very much 
poorer and have participated much less in 1983-85 recovery than other 
Ghanaians and a similar awareness in respect to the urban poor. These
concerns are shared by the PNDC government and most of its members wish to be 
able to act on them before 1989. To do so will require reallocation (by 
direct state, managed market or investment pattern alteration instruments) in 
a context in which the room for cuts to other social actors is less than 
apparent.
Especially given the 1985/86 shifts toward rehabilitating basic services for 
human, sociial, productivity and longer term development reasons the Ghana 
programme to date is a qualified but also a considerable success. Certainly 
it has achieved stabilisation and the first steps toward recovery and - less 
clearly - sustainable structural adjustment. But its own sustainability 
remains far from assured and its long term adequacy is open to doubt.
Some International Institutional Issues
The Ghana programme raises several questions about Fund Stabilisation/Bank 
Structural Adjustment programme strategy and policy. These appear to be 
relevant to most major Fund/Bank efforts in SSA.
The IMF appears to be lending short term 8$ money to finance either conversion 
of arrears into IMF drawings or to provide import support in contexts in which 
no plausible external balance projections suggest it can be repaid except
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through immediate redrawing.
This may give the IMF leverage, but at the cost of providing inappropriate 
programme finance, of leaving the borrowers without first line liquidity if 
(when) a short term shock hits the programme and of using IMF resources for 
purposes arguably outside its remit.
The IMF appears to be in two minds on this issue. It certainly does 
officially - and presumably sincerely - regret being locked in to large, long 
term lending to (drawings by) a series of SSA economies. On the other hand in 
some new programmes - e.g. Tanzania 19 86 - it has apparently pressed for 
larger IMF drawings than the country wanted and in at least one - Zimbabwe 
1986 - has pressed a state to redraw when it wished - and seemed able - to 
repurchase all drawings on schedule to restore its first line liquidity base.
So long as Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes are in fact as well as in 
name (i.e. for major consultative groups backed by large Bank sectoral lending 
as well as for formally titled SAL’s) linked to IMF Higher Credit Tranche 
Agreements the foregoing problem has major potential implications. At the 
worst they are that overuse of shorter term, higher cost, inappropriate 
external credit is a precondition to access to longer term, lower cost, more 
appropriate! The Nigerian 1986 route of negotiating what amounts to a higher 
credit tranche agreement with the Fund but then borrowing from the Bank (and 
the much smaller 1984 Rwandaise programme where IDA credits have in effect 
been substituted for Fund drawings) may be a way forward but one constrained 
domestically by the apparent cost of IMF agreements which yield no funds and 
externally by limits on Bank resources.
In Ghana high use of IMF drawings may have been unavoidable. 1983*s external 
finance was dominantly Bank and Fund - most of the bilaterals hung back to 
await results. However, the probable price to Fund and Ghana alike is high; 
they are mutually locked in for the foreseeable future.
The World Bank in Ghana - as elsewhere in SSA - has not been able to achieve 
pledges equal to its own estimates of minimum levels needed for programme
success. This is not for lack of using as much as possible of its own
resources but rather results from failing to convince donors that resource
flows at the beginning of a programme are crucial - waiting to see what
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happens may well ensure failure whatever the country does. Similarly, Bank 
success at convincing donors to simplify disbursement channels and agree to 
nationally set procedures to reduce the commitment/disbursement lag is to date 
distinctly limited.
Ghana faces debt service ratios (excluding supplementary borrowing) of over 
65$ to the early or mid-1990s as a result of heavy use of IMF and of medium 
term export credits (both also relatively high cost) as a result of inadequate 
availability of longer term, lower cost funding. Equally it continues to face 
very serious lags on disbursements. Indeed the latter were the apparent cause 
of the Secretary for Finance’s externally directed July 1986 bombshell 
statement that the economy was dead in the water and the whole structural 
adjustment exercise in danger. While leading to an emergency development 
assistance (donors) group consultation that statement had major negative 
repercussions on domestic confidence and seems to have led to the forex 
auction system being launched more to show dramatically that the Treasury was 
still able to influence events than because of any very evident analytical 
case or even because external pressure was overwhelming.
Both the Fund and the Bank appear to have been unduly optimistic about the 
speed of export recovery (another endemic charateristic of SSA programmes). 
Neither seems to have re-run world cocoa price projections to see what 150,000 
tonnes extra Ghana output would do to prices. Export revenue projections 
appear to be based on global price projections excluding the proposed 
additional Ghanaian output.
More generally, as noted above, no articulated, overall, medium term strategy 
for raising export levels to meet minimum import requirements without 
(supposedly transitory) structural adjustment aid and to adjust their 
structure to reduce risk and to increase buoyancy has been developed.
Despite the Bank’s own use of restoring 1980 per capita real import levels as 
a rule of thumb medium term recovery target, the only SSA structural 
adjustment programme formally centred on meeting the articulated import 
requirements of stabilisation - recovery - adjustment is the 1986 Tanzania one 
and there the choice of formulation was the borrower’s not the Bank’s. The 
Ghana programme does not include specific sectoral import requirement 
estimates for targetted output levels and, therefore, is not presented as an
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exercise in financing them by a combination of resource transfers and export 
growth.
Other assumptions - e.g. no drought before 1990 which on the historic record 
is unlikely - also look optimistic. The problem - except for the cocoa price 
overestimate and export response lag underestimate - is not that any one 
assumption is hopelessly optimistic. The difficulty is that if each of 6 
assumptions has an 0.6 probability the likelihood of all 6 being on target at 
the same time is under 5$.
This over-optimism is particularly dangerous when programme are underfinanced 
to start and heavy use of IMF drawings has left no first line liquidity source 
available. In the event of a shock there are no safe margins for cutback nor
any emergency, interim resources on which to draw.
Both the Fund (which admittedly makes no claims to expertise in this field)
and the Bank (which does) appear to have suffered from tunnel vision. Basic
needs, food security and basic services were initially overlooked - albeit as 
noted the Bank became alert to this damaging narrowness before some key
Ghanaian ministries and the Fund has at least verbally accepted that many
existing stabilisation programmes may pay inadequate attention to such issues.
The Bank and the Fund both accepted that import increases not decreases were 
necessary for stabilisation, let alone structual adjustment in Ghana and, with 
a lag, accepted the same proposition in respect to real government revenue and 
expenditure.
While posing the question of living wages versus sustained over-staffing in 
the public sector, the Bank arguably has not pressed Ghana hard enough to
reach a coherent strategic decison and a scenario for implementing it. This
seems to have been particularly true in respect to Cocoboard at least until 
1987. The urgency of action there is illustrated by the payout ratio: Growers 
31%, Board 34$, Government 35$.
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Toward Structural Improvement Of Adjustment Programmes
The balance of responsibility for overcoming the shortcomings identified 
varies from case to case. However, it is usually shared. For example, the 
World Bank should take a lead in supporting African proposals for a 
multi-country debtor/creditor dialogue to identify guidelines for regaining 
managability of SSA's external debt. But the African states should make 
rather more concrete proposals as to criteria for satisfactory 
reschedulings/partial writeoffs (or alternative expansion of soft, long term 
import support as a de facto writeoff route) and be willing to consider 
whether uniform criteria for, e.g. the Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria on the one 
hand and, e.g. Ghana, Tanzania, the Sudan, Mozambique and Zambia on the other, 
are either attainable or desirable. Similarly, the basic responsibility for 
avoiding muddles such as Ghana’s 1985-86 wage, allowance and tax changes and 
the very unwise attempt to shock donors by describing the economy as dead in 
the water is surely Ghanaian. But, had donors funded the 19 8 3 -8 6 programmes 
at the levels the World Bank thought prudent and accepted the need (posed by 
the Bank as well as by Ghana) to speed up disbursements, the Ghanaian 
Secretary of Finance would have had more room for manoeuvre (’’as much space as 
possible’’ in his words) and with less pressure to square the circle might well 
have avoided the miscues.
In respect to achieving minimum prudent levels of financing and debt service 
relief and a prudent mix of grant, soft and quasi commercial funding with a 
manageable payments profile, the Bank and Fund need to play the leading role 
(including Fund reconsideration of the appropriateness of higher credit 
tranche drawings for structural adjustments likely to last 10 years) as they 
have more potential for convincing external financial sources than do SSA 
structural adjustment candidates - including Ghana.
In respect to exports the responsibility is eountry/Bank. Logically the prime 
role should be taken by the country but - given the weakness of country 
expertise re new exports (not least in Ghana) and the weight of the Bank’s 
past over-emphasis on existing primary exports and present apparent 
over-optimism on relative price shifts fairly rapidly and automatically 
resulting in substantial export breakthroughs - a parallel Bank intellectual 
and technical assistance lead is needed. Both should realise that what can be 
done is likely to be highly country specific.
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Fiscal policy and practice should be an area of governmental initiative with 
Bank supporting technical inputs if necessary. There are some applicable 
general principles and policies but most programmes come unstuck on details, 
often context specific ones. However, the Bank needs to continue its new 
pragmatism on whether (and when) revenue increases are more appropriate than 
expenditure cuts - the new line sharply illustrated by its switch in respect 
to Ghana. It should also integrate its support for basic services more 
clearly into its fiscal priorities (as should the Government of Ghana) and 
rethink when, what types of service fees are either equitable or cost 
effective revenue raising devices.
Government leadership on achieving coherent, comprehensive, articulated 
agricultural sector strategies and goals is urgently needed. Few SSA 
economies - least of all Ghana - can seriously claim to have them now. In
light of the evidence that overall only 10$ of output growth variations in SSA
are explained by real grower price trends (probably rather more - perhaps 25$ 
- in Ghana), more weight - absolutely and relative to price manipulation - is 
needed to identify and to act on the other 90$ of causation (by the Bank as 
well as the majority of SSA governments in danger of learning that 'if only we 
get the prices right all else will follow' precisely as it is being 
demonstrated to be inadequate). While the Bank can hardly operate shadow 
agricultural strategy exercises for every SSA structural adjustment candidate,
it does need to strengthen its staff in this area or to deploy them on a more
prioritised basis. In the Ghana case - the showcase structural adjustment 
programme in SSA - no in-depth, high level Bank agricultural mission, other 
than for cocoa, appeared until 1986 in the third year of the programme despite 
the known (to Ghana and the Bank) weakness of the Ministry and the record of 
twenty-five years of inadequate food output trend growth which the Bank
(though not Ghana) projects to continue for at least the next five years.
Because agricultural research is long term, has economies of scale and 
coordination and is prominent in the work of only one sub-regional
coordination grouping in Africa (SSA) the Bank should play a catalytic and 
funding role in restructuring and strengthening it. In Ghana it has certainly
not meddled on inadequate knowledge but nor has it proposed a feasible,
prioritised approach. Unless and until research breakthroughs are achieved 
SSA's agricultura growth trend will remain precarious (Ghana is no exception).
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Restoring infrastructure, inputs, basic services and creating effective 
extension of what is known could buy 5 to 10 years of 3 to 4% average annual 
agricultural growth in SSA. But it is vital the time bought be used to create 
a knowledge base to shift the underlying trend, a priority only too easy for a 
single country facing difficult resource constraints and choices to overlook 
or defer too long.
In respect to proper prioritisation for and design of basic services the 
political will needs to come from the governments (as it does from the PNDC) 
and be articulated to inform actual resource allocation priorities drawn up 
between ministerial and treasury professionals (as it arguably does not in 
Ghana). The Bank is not intellectually a leader in this field but it does 
have a - somewhat outside its own mainstream - commitment to such services on 
production, fabric of society (and consent) maintenance and equity grounds 
which should not simply be encouraged but integrated into its overall approach 
to structural adjustment. Bringing it in two years after the programme 
starts, on a semi-integrated basis and with a fascination for user charge 
financing whatever its technical, fiscal or equity limitations is not good 
enough.
Income distribution (social actor participation in gains and costs) whether 
based on equity, social stability, human welfare or/and production grounds is 
not an area in which external actors can usually shift a governing coalitions 
strategy more than marginally. Trying to do so may, in fact, produce worse 
results than accepting that only marginal changes will be acceptable because 
of new measures to offset what the external actors thought had been 'agreed' 
in an explicit policy change package or because attempts to enforce the 
'agreed' (read imposed) measures rend the fabric of society (Sudan 1985, 
Zambia 1986 explosions over price increases or freeing excluding wages from 
the prices increased or freed). Neither result is likely to be economically 
efficient and the latter is particularly likely to have negative output and 
government authority/credibility costs. What the Bank and Fund should do is 
to seek to understand what government's real income distribution goals and 
motivations are; to look at policies designed to further them with an 
initially open mind (e.g. Zimbabwe's phasing out food subsidies and in 
parallel boosting the minimum and other low wages to compensate that group of 
poor people) and to suggest more cost efficient ways of furthering the stated 
ends when existing instruments are too costly or inefficient. This should
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work two ways, i.e. states pursuing massively and increasingly unequal income 
distribution - for whatever reasons - and using high cost measures which 
increase the numbers in absolute poverty (arguably Malawi, Zaire and to a 
lesser degree Kenya are examples) need to be advised just as fully as ones 
pursuing fuzzy and impracticable populism or welfarism (arguably pre-1983 
Ghana and Zambia). At present only the latter seem to be admonished with much 
energy or any warning that lack of change might put funds at risk.
One area in which more government initiative - and greater Fund, Bank, donor 
acceptance thereof - is needed is overall programme strategy and parameter 
design. The Bank (and occasionally the Fund) in SSA programmes usually does 
allow the government to do the actual detailed formulation but only on an 
agenda of the Bank’s choosing. This is not necessarily primarily the Bank's 
fault in all cases. Many SSA governments have been notably lacking in putting 
up serious alternative agendae and working drawings toward programme 
blueprints. In cases in which they have - e.g. Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Nigeria - 
the final agreements do appear to be noticeably different from the standard 
package. States have often not done their homework - Ghana's 1982 strategy, 
however laudable in vision, was not practicable and when that became clear to 
the PNDC late in the year it had no alternative to hand other than the Fund 
plus Bank one and no time left to seek to draw one up. But the Bank appears 
to be too paternalistic - or too prone to see itself as a Platonic Guardian 
guiding low rank "Warriors" (in Plato's class structure) - in its approach to 
SSA proposals and counter-proposals.
All of these issues - or lessons of experience - do arise from Ghanaian
1983-86 experience. All appear to have more general reference to low (and 
lower middle) income Sub-Saharan Africa and probably to small and medium sized 
low and lower middle income economies in Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean and 
Latin America as well. A few more rules of thumb may also be generalisable 
from Ghanaian experience - as swiftly compared with that elsewhere in SSA.
First, avoid gimmicks and especially the belief that they are nostrums which 
will eradicate basic structural problems rapidly and painlessly. "No foreign 
exchange" (i.e. external income, asset or - more probably - smuggling proceed 
financed) import licenses and forex auctions are among the glaring examples. 
In SSA the former may be relatively innocuous, but also useless, or a very 
effective incentive to outward smuggling with Ghana illustrating the former
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and Tanzania the latter end of the spectrum. Forex auctions may be marginally 
useful if sensibly managed, but do not obviate the need to have priorities 
beyond buyer financial resources for allocating imports nor that to take a 
view on appropriate forex price levels and trends. They may help depoliticise 
exchange rate (foreign currency price) changes but are not the only method and 
may well fail to do so if they appear to drive up the auction and parallel 
market rates dramatically and at rates well in excess of inflation. Why 
frequent, small, technically (e.g. Treasury, Central Bank) determined changes 
would not be superior in most contexts (and a panacea in none) is not at all 
self evident.
Second, assume ten years for structural adjustment of a badly debilitated 
economy (e.g. Ghana, Tanzania, Zaire; ten years after peace in Sudan, Chad, 
Mozambique, Uganda) and five years for a less severely impacted one (e.g. 
Zimbabwe). Attempting to "prove" a shorter period is adequate by juggling 
projections and assumptions can be very costly. Even with absolutely 
objective analysis complications, side effects and lags on average tend to be 
underestimated. If results come faster than expected then the costs of that 
'mistake' are low.
Third, make real import requirement and, therefore, export and external 
financing requirements for ten years and build articulated targets (and 
plausible means to achieving them) into the core of the programme.
Fourth, avoid underfunding (or funding scrabbled together on too costly terms 
and with too early a repayment profile) and above all 'reconciling' funding 
gaps by marking down levels needed thereby destroying the feasibility and 
consistency of the whole programme.
Fifth, recognise that too optimistic goals (which are then not met) and 
radical and repetitive chopping and changing of policy have high credibility 
and consent cost both externally and - a fortiori - domestically. Zambia with 
the 1987 collapse of its stabilisation programme after repetitive missed 
(resource provider and Zambian targets) and increasing policy incoherence and 
instability is a glaring current case. This is probably especially true when 
they follow a period of incoherent policies and sustained economic unsuccess 
and are nearly certain to be read as a continuation of or return to that 
record. This cannot mean avoidance of changes when the existing targets or
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policies are clearly unsustainable but precisely for that reason it is a 
counsel for care in pre-adoption projection and policy/parameter design work.
But generalisations from the Ghanaian experience also have severe limitations 
even in low income SSA. A country with a less anarchic economy, a more 
coherent economic strategy and a firmer political base may well not need (nor 
be willing to accept) as violent an intital shock as Ghana in 1983 and may 
have far more seriously articulated and arguably practicable strategic 
parameters and policies to counter-propose than Ghana did. These are 
strengths for the country and its people if and only if the Fund, the Bank and 
donors/lenders as well as the government see them as assets but wasting assets 
and do not embark on and continue to voyage through interminable negotiations 
while the situation worsens (e.g. the Tanzanian case over 1981-86 in which 
while relative to 1981 external proposals the actual 1986 agreement is much 
better, the cost in economic weakening over the period has been very high). 
Per contra a government with a similar economic position but a much lower 
domestic credibility (or a stronger internal political opposition) probably 
could not survive adopting and enforcing a programme as stringent as Ghana’s. 
The importance in this respect as well as in focusing systematic attention on 
economic policy choices (even if some of the initial ones were not viable) of 
the PNDC’s 1982 actions appears to be a potentially generalisable point from 
the Ghana experience which has been widely overlooked.
Perhaps one final generalisation is in order. Ghana’s structural adjustment 
is the longest continuously running (completing four years in March 1987), 
externally backed one in SSA. It has had full governmental and very 
substantial Bank support. It has been - in many if not all respects - 
conceptually sound and energetically implemented. It has also been lucky 
(e.g. drought to good weather, oil price fall, relatively good export price 
performance at least until the second half of 1986). But it is still 
problematic as to success, intensely fragile to domestic and external shocks 
and unable to be even relatively assured of meeting basic targets even in a 
year of relatively favourable weather and external price conditions. Neither 
GFCF nor real imports have been restored to levels consistent with stable, 
long term growth. Realistic projections suggest at least six more years 
(1988-1993) of large (probably larger) special soft resource injections will 
be needed if Ghana is to be able to return to ’normal’ net external financing 
requirements consistent with 4$ or higher average GDP growth (the minimum for
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any serious attention to employment, food security, absolute poverty or basic 
needs). There is no reason to suppose that initial problems, payoffs and 
prospects will be better in more than a handful (e.g. Zimbabwe) of SSA's 25 
odd structural adjustment candidates and good reason to expect them to be 
poorer and more intractable - in several (e.g Burkina, Chad, Mozambique, 
Sudan, Uganda, Zaire). Since, barring the discovery of fairies with crocks of 
gold payable to SSA economies at the end of two bakers' dozen rainbows, these 
countries need structual adjustment for their and their peoples' sakes 
(whatever outsiders do or do not advocate) this is not a counsel not to try 
but a warning of how costly, hard and lengthy the road is likely to be even 
when - as in Ghana - some clear gains are won fairly promptly.
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Annex
Population And Per Capita Trends
Ghana population data for most years since 1970 are open to grave doubt. The 
1970 and 1984 Census results may well be reasonably accurate but the 
interpolations between them, the underlying population growth trend and the 
probable future resident population trend are problematic.
The 1984 Census figure of 12,20,000 shows a raw growth rate of 2.6$ a year 
from 1970s Census outturn of 8,559,000. However, several problems arise:
a. population growth has been estimated at 3$ to 3-25$ excluding net 
immigration/emigration;
b. pre-1983 estimates of Ghanaians abroad in West Africa were as high as
2,000,000 (UNICEF) and up to 250,000 were probably elsewhere in Africa 
and in Europe - North America - Middle East. That would be roughly 
consistent with 3$ to 3.25$ underlying population growth;
c. after 1970 some non-Ghanaians may have left Ghana (net) albeit the major 
expulsions came in 1969;
d. over 1973-75 and even more 1979-82 large numbers of Ghanaians (of all 
social classes and education levels) flocked to jobs in faster growing 
economies, especially Nigeria (reversing the pre-1965 pattern);
e. in 1983 1,000,000 (quasi official Ghanaian figure) or 500,000 (private 
and some quasi private official estimates) Ghanaians were repatriated by 
Nigeria but a substantial number seeped back with 150,000-200,000 
reportedly re-repatriated in 1985;
f. the most recent government data show about 2.6$ increase 19 8 0 -8 3
(allowing no room for any repatriation), under 2$ 1983-84; over 4$
1984-85; slightly over 3$ 19 8 5 -8 6 which correspond neither with Central 
Bureau of Statistics figures (which are close to straight 2.6$ 
interpolations) nor with any coherent adjustment for a -say - 3$
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underlying rate plus (minus) net emigration (representation).
This set of uncomfortable facts strongly suggests that 1970-82 GDP and food 
availability per capita falls are overstated. By the same token 1982-1983 
falls are understated quite significantly even if net returnees were only
500,000. 1984 and subsequent year estimates may be about right (assuming net
repatriation of 100-125,000 in 1985).
Thus any per capita trend data for periods running beyond 1970 but ending 
before 1983 are open to doubt as are any projections assuming 2.6$ population 
growth since substantial net out-migration is unlikely to be possible in the 
short or medium term with both Nigeria and the Cote d'Ivoire depreseed and 
cracking down on "foreign Africans" and somewhat similar conditions (at least 
so far as Ghanaian residence and job access go) pertaining in Western Europe.
Annual agricultural production data are so weak, contradictory and generally 
implausible as to make any attempt to check 1983—1985 returnee estimates by
19 8 4 -1 9 8 6 food crop output nearly useless. The high 1983/84 increase could be 
weather alone or to include a misallocation of cassava between 1983 and 1984; 
the 1984/85 purported decline appears to result from an underweighting and 
underestimation of root crops (a decrease in output and very slow post crop 
food price increases are hard to reconcile); 19 8 5 /8 6 tentative 4.5$ growth of 
food output looks plausible even without assuming substantial 1985 net 
repatriation.
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ANNEX - TABLE 1 
AVERAGE GROWTH RATES KEY INDICATORS: 1965-83 
(per cent)
Item 1965-73 1973-8:
1. Population3 2.2 3.1
2. £Domestic production
(a) GDP 3-4 -1.3
(b) GDP per capita 1.2 -4.4
(c) Agriculture 4.5 0.0
(d) Industry 4.3 -7.0
(e) Services 1.1 -0.3
3. Merchandise trade
(a) Exports3 3.5 -6.4
(b) Imports3 -3.3 -8.0
(c) Terms of Trade -6.5
4. Cocoa production13
5. Food sector
(a) QFood production 2.0 -2.7
(b) Food production per capita0 -0.3 -5.9
(c) Calorie availability per capita0 1.3 -3.9
(i) from cereals 3.8 -3.3
(ii) from roots and tubers -2.0 -1.8
(d) Protein availability per capita0 4.1 -4.0
6. Inflation
(a) Consumer prices 6-3d 49.9*(b) Food (local and imported) prices 6-6d 53*2(c) Non-food prices 5 . 8 46.5
3. t)World Bank, 1985. Based on data provided by Ghana Cocoa Board, 1986. 
c FAO and FAO computer print-outs, 198 6. d Based on data in Bequele, 1980, 
Appendix table 7 with the weights for local and imorted food (0.5207 and
0.0295) from the World Bank. 
Statistics.
Based on data from Ghana Central Bureau of
Source: Adapted from Tabatabai, 19 8 6.
ANNEX - TABLE 2
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, AREA, YIELD TRENDS: 1970-1983
(per cent)
Crop Production Area Yield
Ghana North South Ghana North South Ghana North South
1970— 81
Cereals -2.3 0.4 -5.9 -1.9 0.3 -6.6 -0.4 0.1 0.7
Maize -4.2 1.4 -5.9 -4.1 1.9 -6.7 -0.1 -0.6 0.8
Rice -0.4 1.0 -6.1 -1.1 0.3 -6.1 0.7 0.7 -0.1
Millet 0.9 0.9 - 0.5 0.5 - 0.4 0.4 -
Guinea corn -0.1 -0.8 - -1.0 -0.8 - 0.0 0.0 -
Starchy staples -3.7 -1.2 -3.8 -5.0 -2.2 -5.3 1.3 1.0 1.4
Cassava -0.4 2.0 -0.4 -1.6 1.3 -1.6 1.2 0.7 1.2
Cocoyam -4.5 - -4.5 -5.7 - -5.7 1.2 - 1.2
Yam -6.0 -1.9 -8.7 -6.1 -2.5 -9.7 0.1 0.7 1.0
Plantain -8.7 - -8.8 -9.3 - -9.4 0.6 - 0.6
1970-83
Cereals -3.4 -0.9 -7.1 -1.6 0.0 -5.0 -1.8 -0.9 -2.1
Maize -6.2 -2.2 -7.3 -3.7 -0.3 -5.1 -2.5 -1.8 -2.2
Rice -3.8 -4.2 -4.6 -3.2 -3.5 -3.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Millet 0.0 0.0 - 0.7 0.7 - -0.7 -0.7 -
Guinea corn -0.8 -0.6 - -0.3 -0.1 - -0.5 -0.5 -
Starcy Staples -4.7 -2.7 -4.8 -4.8 -2.3 -5.0 0.1 -0.4 0.2
Cassava -2.6 -3.9 -2.5 -2.2 -2.8 -2.1 -0.4 -1.1 -0.4
Cocoyam -4.6 - -4.6 -4.9 - -4.9 0.4 - 0.4
Yam -6.7 -2.0 -10.0 -6.0 -1.8 -10.3 -0.8 -0.2 0.4
Plantain -8.1 — -8.1 -8.1 -8.1 0.0 0.0
Source: Based on unpublished data Ministry of Agriculture. Unfortunately other unpublished 
data from same Ministry are contradictory and all are of doubtful accuracy.
-f-
A N N E X  — TABLE  3
GDP BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN AT CONSTANT 1980 PRICES, 1980-1985
(Million Cedis)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 *
Agriculture 21,589 21,036 20,352 19,187 21,151 21,974
Agriculture and Livestock 14,723 14,607 13,990 12,938 14,880 15,106
Cocoa . .  ........................... 3,979 3,805 3,613 3,322 3,256 3,585
Forestry and Logging 2,216 1,945 2,097 2,263 2,336 2,570
Fishing 672 679 652 664 679 713
Industry ........................... 6,533 5,489 4,554 3,986 4,278 4,863
Mining and Quarrying 517 479 439 394 409 467
M a n u fa c tu r in g ........................... 4,197 3,388 2,694 2,555 2,811 3,234
Electricity and Water 314 351 323 197 183 241
Construction ........................... 1,505 1,270 1,099 840 876 920
Services ................................................... 12,886 13,315 12,826 13,490 13,987 14,686
Transport and Communications 1,211 1,292 1,307 1,402 1,446 1,518
Trade and Hotels 4,060 3,982 3,569 3,745 3,972 4,170
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate 2,715 2,836 2,923 3,028 3,115 3,271
Government Services 4,446 4,746 4,549 4,819 4,928 5,175
Other S e r v i c e s ........................... 455 459 479 496 526 552
Imputed Service Charges -890 - 1,080 - 1,213 - 1,289 - 1,373 - 1,453
Import D u tie s ....................................... 589 388 250 314 365 383
GDP at Market Prices 40,708 39,149 36,770 35,689 38,409 40,453
Per Capita GDP (Cedis) 3,667 3,437 3,145 2,977 3,125 3,208
Population (Million) 11.10 11.39 11.69 11.99 12.29 12.61
* Estimated N ote: Totals may not add up due to rounding
Source: Tables 3 to 8 and 11 to 19 adopted - in some cases adapted -
from 1985 and 1987 Government of Ghana Consultative Group 
Submission, 1985. 1987 Submission is not directly
comparable changing base year to 1975 and altering some 
bases of calculation.
A N N E X  — TABLE 4
GDP BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN AT CONSTANT 1980 PRICES, GROWTH RATES.
1980-1985
(Per cent)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 *
Agriculture 2.2 -2 .6 -3 .3 -5 .7 10.2 3.9
Agriculture and Livestock 0.1 -0 .8 -4 .2 -7 .5 15.0 1.5
Cocoa 9.5 -4 .4 - 5 0 -8.1 -2 .0 10.1
Forestry and Logging 2.0 -12.2 7.8 7.9 3.2 10.0
Fishing 9.1 1.1 - 4 0 1.9 2.2 5.0
Industry ....................................... 0.3 -16.0 -17 .0 -12.5 7.3 13.7
Mining and Quarrying -3.1 -7 .3 -8-4 -1 0 .1 3.7 14.3
M a n u fa c tu r in g .......................... -1 .4 -19.3 -20-5 -5 .1 10.0 15.1
Electricity and Water 12.9 11.9 -8.1 -38 .9 -7 .4 32.0
Construction .......................... 4.3 -15.6 -13.5 -23.6 4.3 5.0
Services................................................... -2 .3 3.3 -3 .7 5.2 3.7 5.0
Transport and Communications -13.2 6.8 1.1 7.3 3.1 5.0
Trade and Hotels -8 .6 -1 .9 -10.4 5 0 6.0 5.0
Banking, Insurance Real, Estate . . 3 9 4.5 3.0 3.6 2.9 5 0
Government Services 1.8 6.7 -4 .2 5.9 2.3 5.0
Other S e r v i c e s ........................... 23.9 0.8 4.5 3.7 5.9 5.0
Imputed Services Charges -27.9 21.3 12.3 6.3 6.5 5.9
Import D u tie s ....................................... -9.1 -34.1 -35.5 25.4 1 6 3 5.0
GDP at Market Prices 1.2 -3 .8 -6.1 -2 .9 7.6 5.3
Per Capita GDP -1 .4 -6 .3 -8 .5 -5 .4 5.0 2.6
Population 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2 6
*Estimated
A N N E X  -T A B L E  5 
GDP BY EXPENDITURE AT CONSTANT 1980 PRICES. 1980-1985 
(Million Cedis)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 *
Private Consumption 31,189 27,525 25.232 25,575 28,579 30,008
Public C o n su m p tio n ........................... 7,166 8,293 7,376 7,228 7,396 7,766
Gross Domestic Investment 3,582 3,261 2,506 2,813 3,281 3,445
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment 3,768 3,327 2,566 2,818 3,275 3,438
Changes in Stocks -186 -66 -60 -4 7 7
Net E x p o r t s ....................................... -1,229 70 1,655 73 -847 -889
Exports of Goods and NFS 4,779 4,360 5,025 3,548 2,993 3,143
Imports of Goods and NFS -6,007 -4,290 -3,369 -3,475 -3,840 -4,032
Gross Domestic Product 40,708 39,149 36,770 35,689 38,409 40,330
Net Factor Income from Abroad -397 -239 -213 -219 -212 -222
Gross National Product 40,311 38,910 36,557 35,470 38,197 40,107
Less Consumption of Fixed Capital . . -2,280 -2.308 -2,403 -1,194 -1,185 -1,244
National Income 38,031 36,602 34,154 34,277 37,012 38,863
Other Current Transfers Received
Abroad 399 325 294 392 508 534
National Disposable Income 38,429 36,927 34,447 34,669 37,521 39.397
*Estimated
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding
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Á N N E X  —TABLE  6  
GDP BY EXPENDITURE. PERCENTAGE SHARES. 1980-1985
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985*
Private Consumption . .  . .  . .  76.6
Public Consumption . .  . .  . .  17.6
Gross Domestic Investment . .  . .  8 .8
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment 9.3 
Changes in Stocks . .  . .  -0 .5
Net Exports . .  . .  . .  . .  _3.0
Exports of Goods and NFS !. 11.7
Imports of Goods and NFS . .  -14 .8
Gross Domestic Product . .  . .  100.0
Net Factor Income from Abroad . .  - 1.0
Gross National Product . .  . .  99.0
Less Consumption of Fixed Capital . .  -5 .6
National Income . .  . .  93.4
Other Current transfers Received 
Abroad . .  . .  . .  . .  j .0
National Disposable Income . .  . .  94.4
70.3 68.6 71.7 74.4 74.4
21.2 20.1 20.3 19.3 19.3
8.3 6.8 7.9 8.5 8.5
8.5 7.0 7.9 8.5 8.5
-0 .2 - 0.2 .0 .0 .0
0.2 4.5 0.2 - 2.2 - 2.2
11.1 13.7 9.9 7.8 7.8
- 11.0 -9 .2 -9 .7 - 10.0 - 10.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
-0 .6 -0 .6 -0 .6 -0 .6 -0 .6
99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4
-5 .9 -6 .5 -3 .3 -3.1 -3.1
93.5 92.9 96.0 96.4 96.4
0.8 0.8 1.1 1.3 1 3
94.3 93.7 97.1 97.7 97.7
‘Estimated
PRODUCTION OF MAJOR COMMODITIES AND GENERATION OF ELECTRICITY: 1980-1986
ANNEX - TABLE 7
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Cereals ('000 tons)
Maize
Rice
Other Cereals
382
78
213
376
97
250
346
36
162
172
40
96
574
76
315
395
80
305
495
80
330
Total 673 723 544 308 965 780 905
Cassava ('000 tons) 2,322 2,063 2,470 1,729
(2,529)
4,005
(3,205)
3,075 3,040
Cocoa ('000 tons) 258 224 179 158 175 219 230
Gold (' 000 Fine 
Troy Ounces) 353 341 331 277 287 299 288
Diamonds ('000 
Carats) 1,149 837 684 340 346 632 555
Manganese ('000 
long tons)
Bauxite ('000 tons)
250
225
223
181
160
64
173
70
287
49
316
170
332
204
Logs (f000 cubic 
metres) 480 550 410 560 578 620 890
Sawnwood ('000 
cubic metres 150 190 150 189 180 223 232
Hydro-Electricity 
(mn KWH) 5,316 5,373 4,982 2,575 1,819 3,020 3,599
From 1987 Consultative Group submission. Substantial revisions 
of some entries from 1985 as far back as 1980.
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ANNEX - TABLE 8 
PRICE INCREASES (NATIONAL CPI) 1980-1986
Total Non-Food Food
1980 50 - -
1981 116 - -
1982 22 - -
1983 122 100 145
1984 40 69 11
1985 12 35 -11
1986 (Est.) (33) (50) (15)
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ANNEX - TABLE 9 
REAL WAGES/SALARIES 1980-1985
Real wage
1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 ratios
1985 over 
1983
A. Unskilled labour
Civil service 322
Public corporations 647
Private sector 729
B. Semi-skilled labour
Civil service 398
Public corporations 718
Private sector 855
C. Supervisor/Junior manager
Civil service 698
Public corporations 1,280
Private sector 1,985
D. Accountants
Civil service 1,194
Public corporations 1,739
Private sector 2,217
E. Engineer/Other 
senior professional
Civil service 1,273
Public corporations 1,951
Private sector 3,785
F. Senior management
Civil service 1,808
Public corporations 2,286
Private sector 6,872
419
525
677
329
416
442
354
406
508
712
709
876
2.16 
1.70 
1.98
476
553
764
355
429
480
373
416
591
737
737
914
2.08 
1.72 
1.90
716
1,110
1,835
467
676
1,332
452 
590 
1,278
846
941
1,978
1.81
1.39
1.48
1,090
1,468
3,367
641
843
1,931
576
708
1,794
1,016
1,159
2,792
1.59 
1.37 
1.45
1,149
1,593
3,367
668
905
1,931
595 
753 
2,140
1,043
1,259
3,220
1.56 
1.39 
1.67
1,858
2,091
6,035
877
1,038
3,627
701
847
3,733
1,188 
1,578 
5,126
1.35 
1.52 
1.41
Source: World Bank
- 1 -
ANNEX - TABLE 10 
RECONSTRUCTED BUDGET ACCOUNTS CLERK: LATE 1985
INCOME Cedi
Net Pay Slip 2,150
Housing Allowance 430
Other Allowances 570
Tips, Sales Memos, etc. 1,250
Wife - Vegetable Selling 3,500
Wife - Other Informal 500
Other Household Members 1,000
Total Income 9,000
EXPENDITURE
Pay Day Chop ("day we must enjoy") 
Weekday Chop (evening only)
Weekend Chop (morning/evening) 
Other Chop
Children's Food Pocket Money
Clerk's Lunch Money
Transport to Work (communal taxi)
Rent
Water Electricity 
Education/Medical, etc. 
Clothing/Household Supplies 
Football/Lotto/Beer/Cigarettes
750 
3,000 
1,600 
500 
400 
400 
600 
300 
150 
100 
600 
600
1.3 
1
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2
2.4
1.5
( 6 , 6 5 0 )
9,000
1. Paid by Clerk or mixed.
2. Dominantly paid by Wife.
3. Chicken Cedi 450; Other Cedi 300.
4. Implicitly \ shirt, 1 metre cloth, 2 cakes soap a month.
5. Implicitly 3 bottles beer, 40 cigarettes, 1 football match,
2 Lotto forms a month:
Source: Adapted From West Africa 27-1-86 and fragmentary data on
expenditure, income patterns. Estimate roughly squares with 
World Bank quasi survey suggesting wage earning household 
expenditure four times wages and over two thirds on food. 
Raises doubts as to appropriateness 50% food weight in Cost of 
Living Index.
ANNEX - TABLE 11 
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND SALE OF ELECTRICITY, 1980-1986
*
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Cocoa Beans
Value (US$ million) 709 401 384 252 352 376 483
Volume ('000 tons) 211 190 239 159 150 171 198
Cocoa Products
Value (US$ million) 84 41 34 27 30 36 36
Volume ('000 tons) 23 14 16 15 15 16 18
Gold
Value (US$ million) 190 159 122 102 103 91 106
Volume ('000 Fine Troy
Ounces) 348 346 302 278 286 285 288
Timber
Value (US$ million) 34 36 16 15 21 29 48
Volume ('000 cubic metres) 185 219 111 103 126 247 354
Residual Oil and Electricity
Value (US$ million) 56 51 48 34 43 68 67
Others
Value (US$ million) 31 23 38 16 18 32 33
Total
Value (US$ million) 1,104 711 642 441 566 632 773
* Estimated Based on 1987 submission
ANNEX - TABLE 12
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1983 - 1984 
(US $ Million)
1983 Actual 1984 Provisional
Exports (F.O.B.) 439 566
Cocoa 269 382
Non-Cocoa 171 184
Imports (F.O.B.) -500 -616
Oil -145 - 1 6 1
Non-Oil -355 -455
Trade Balance -61 -50
Services (Net) -186 -229
Of which: Interest Paymentsl/ -82 - 1 0 1
Unrequited Transfer (Net) 29 78
Private 17 74
0thers2/ 12 4
Current Account Balance -2 1 8 -201
Government Capital (Net) 88 197
Grant¿/ 61 125
Long-Term Loans (Net)8/ 15 84
Gross Inflows 84 133
Amortization -69 -50
Medium-Term Loans (Net) 13 - 1 1
Gross Inflows 68 55
Amortization -55 -654/
Trust Fund 0 - 1
Private Capital (Net)9/ 13 -9
Direct Investment 2 2
Suppliers' Credits 12 - 1 1
Others 61 -85
Capital Account Balance 163 104
Errors and Omissions -187 20
Overall Balance -243 -78
Monetary Movements 243 78
IMF (Net)7/ 259 214
Payments Arrears -34 -60
Supplementary Borrowing 0 0
Increase in Reserves],/ 0 -35
Others 18 -416/
Notes: 1/ Includes profits and dividends.
2/ Consists of technical assistance, pension payments and others.
3/ Excludes technical assistance.
4/ Excludes the amount of the Nigerian oil credit paid during 1984. 
5/ Negative numbers mean increase in reserves.
6/ Includes the amount of the Nigerian oil credit paid during 1984.
7/ Excludes possible new standby or Structural Adjustment Facility
Drawings.
8/ 1985-1989 data not broken down by maturity.
9/ For 1985-1989 lumped in other.
ANNEX - TABLE 12
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1985 - 1989 
(OS $ Million)
1985 1986
Esti­
mated
1987
Pro­
jected
1988
Pro­
jected
1989
Pro­
jected
Exports Of Which 632 773 777 845 920
Coca (412) (519) (475) (490) (524)
% [65] [68] [62] [58] [56]
Imports Of Which -726 -780 -891 -985 -1073
Oil (199) (-125) (-148) (-153) (-158)
Trade Balance -94 -7 -144 -140 -153
Non Factor Services (Net) -110 -131- -154 -172 -182
Resource Balance -204 -138 -268 - 3 1 2 -335
Net Factor Income -111 -105 -113 -125 -125
Net Private Transfer 32 49 50 80 120
Current Account Balance 283 -194 -331 -357 -340
Financed By: Grants 93 115 162 157 194
Official Medium And Long 
Term Loans (Net) 39 111 264 247 222
Disbursements (287) (358) (418) (424) (396)
Amortization (-248) (-248) (-154) (-178) (-173)
Other Capital 19 -70 13 74 29
Errors And Omissions 16 -18 - - -
Capital Accounts (Net) 167 138 439 478 445
Overall Balance -117 -56 . 108 121 106
Monetary Movements 117 56 -108 -175 -123
Of Which Net IMFJ/ 112 17 -102 -235 -161
Arrears Reduction -57 -4 -26 -72 -73
Financing Gap2/ - - 79 203 148
Res Implicit + = Fall +62 +43 -59 -17 -20
Notes: 1/ Capital Receipts excludes borrowings by Bank of Ghana.
2/ Does not take into account purchases under future programme with 
the IMF or resources from the Structural Adjustment Facility.
ANNEX - TABLE 13 
EXTERNAL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, 1983-1988
(US$ Million)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Actual Provi- Estima- Projected Projected Projected
sional ted
Capital Required 485 522 657 800 927 985
Current Account Deficit 218 201 346 405 463 476
IMF Repurchases 0 4 0 19 137 207
Amortization (Official) 125 115 236 256 208 204
Payment Arrears 34 60 60 60 60 53
Capital N.E.S. 109 107 14 10 10 10
Increase in Reserves 0 35 0 50 50 35
Assumed Capital Available 485 522 657 800 927 985
Official Dev. Asst. 145 259 288 535 550 550
Loans 84 133 200 294 303 295
Grants 61 125 88 241 247 255
Medium-Term Loans 68 55 198 164 155 155
Supplementary Borrowing 0 0 0 41 175 225
Private Borrowing 12 -11 46 52 33 31
Direct Foreign Investment 2 2 6 8 14 24
IMF Purchases 259 218 120 0 0 0
Memorandum Items:
Exports of Goods and NFS 477 613 647 756 917 1,057
Imports of Goods and NFS 
Interest Payments including
642 791 933 1,110 1,310 1,458
IMF Charges 82 101 111 152 173 190
IMF Charges 20 21 -47 -45 -42 -32
Debt Service Ratios
Excluding IMF 39.1% 31.8% 46.4% 47.4% 36.9% 34.3%
Including IMF 43.2% 35.9% 53.7% 55.8% 56.5% 56.9%
Including IMF and Arrears
Reduction 50.3% 45.6% 62.9% 63.6% 63.0% 61.9%
As % Gross Capital Inflows 56% 58% 65% 671% 68% * 67i%
* Excluding Supplementary Borrowing and Debt Service thereon
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ANNEX - TABLE 14 
EXTERNAL DEBT END 1985
Total $ 2.4 billion
(IMF_________ .656)
Multilateral .792
Bilateral .966
Bank/Others .442
Arrears .200
Interest/Exports 21.6%
Debt/Exports 355%
Debt/GDP 23$
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SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS AND DISBURSEMENTS, 1985-89
(US $ Million)
ANNEX - TABLE 15
Project
Pro­
gramme/
Sector
Food/
Com­
modity Total
Actual
1985
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/84
1985 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements 
Exchange Rate Adjustment
1986
291
262
103
140
196
80
83
29
41
541
487
224
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/85 
1986 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements 
Exchange Rate Adjustment
446
217
124
253
143
189
70
31
44
769
391
357
+56
Projected
1987
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/86 
19 87 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements
577
295
186
220
230
199
62
50
43
859
575
428
1988
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/87 
1988 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements
686
342
219
251
240
202
69
53
48
1006
635
469
1989
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/88 
1989 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements
809
351
254
289
230
188
74
55
45
1172 
636 
487
1990
Undisbursed Balance 906 331 84 1321
ANNEX - TABLE 16
AID COMMITMENTS BY DONORS, 1984-86 
(US $ Million)
Members of the CG for Ghana 1984 1985 1986
Bilateral
Canada 45 33 23
France 1 12 25
Germany 18 13 24
Italy 1 16 1
Japan 4 36 14
Switzerland 6 9 6
U.K. 10 11 26
U.S.A. 21 17 11
Sub-total (Bilaterals) 105 147 130
Multilateral
ADB 31 79 29
BADEA
Development in Africa 0 9 0
E.E.C. 57 26 31
E.I.B. 10 0 37*
F.A.O. 0 0 0
I.F.A.D. 0 0 0
U.N.D.P. 4 4 4
W.F.P. 79 8 9
World Bank 125 187 93
Sub-total (Multilaterals) 306 313 203
Observers at the CG for Ghana
Australia 1 0 0
Brazil 0 0 0
C.D.C. 0 1 24
China 0 0 0
Denmark 0 5 0
India 0 0 °*Korea 0 0 0
Kuwait Funds 0 0 0
Netherlands 13 6 18
Norway 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0
O.P.E.C. Fund 0 6 0
Saudi Fund for Development 0 9 13
NGOs 0 0 3
Sub-total (Observers) JÜ 27 58
Grand Total 425 487 391
Note 1. Data converted at exchange rates prevailing at end of year indicated.
2. Data may not add up due to rounding.
* Less than US $0.5 million.
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ANNEX - TABLE 16b
AID DISBURSEMENT BY DONORS 1984-86 
(US $ million)
Donor 1984 1985
Revised
1986
Consultative Group Members
Bilateral
Canada 45 15 14
France 1 0 0
Germany 27 18 22
Italy 1 2 1
Japan 6 17 16
Switzerland 6 4 9
U.K. 18 12 21
U.S.A. 23 17 13
Sub-total (Bilaterals) 119 85 96
Multilateral
ADB/ADF 14 22 20
BADEA 0 0 0
E.E.C. 47 13 33
E.I.B. 6 2 3
F.A.O. 0 0 0
I.F.A.D. 0 2 2
U.N.D.P. 3 4 4
U.N.I.C.E.F. 0 2 3
W.F.P. 14 14 25
World Bank 54 72 166
Sub-total (Multilaterals) 138 131 255
Others
Australia 0.5 0 0
Brazil 0 0 0
C.D.C. 0.7 1 1
China 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0
India 0 0 0
Korea 0 0 0
Kuwait Funds 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 7 5
N.G.O.s 0 0 0
O.P.E.C. 0 0 0
Saudi Fund 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0
Sub-total (Others) 1.2 8 6
Grand Total (C.G. Members & Others 285 224 357
Note 1. Data converted at exchange rates prevailing at time of disbursements.
2. Data may not add up due to rounding.
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ANNEX
TABLE 17 Main Economic Indicators (Average
Annual Change: X)
Consumer
Price
Index
Total
Real GDP 
Per 
Capita
Exports Imports Maize
Output
1980 50.1 1.2 -1.4 3.6 12.5
1981 116.5 -3.8 -6.3 -35.6 ' 5.1 -1
1982 22.3 ' -6.1 -8.5 -9.8 -38.2 -8
1983 121.9 -2.9 -5.4 -31.5 -1.8 -50
1984 40.2 7.6 5.0 28.9 23.2 233
1985 (Est) 1 20.0 5.3 2.6 7.8 18.0 -5
1. CPI actual 12. GDP actual probably underestimated because 
1.5% food output growth estimate appears incompatible with 
11% food price decline and food exports.
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ANNEX - TABLE 18 Sources and Uses of Foreign Exchange, 1983-85
(Million $)
SOURCES USES
1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985
Own Sources
Exports (fob) 439 566 610 Imports (fob) 500 616 727
Service (Receipts) 
Total
39
478
49
615
38
648
Service
Payments 225 278 319
External Sources Amortiza­
tion - 124 115 236
Grants
Long-term Loans 
Medium-term Loans
Private Capital 
and Transfers 
(Net)
61
84
68
103
125
133
55
-17
88
200
198
88
Long-term Loans (69) 
Medium
term Loans (55)
(50)
(65)
(33)
(203)
Reduction in
payments
arrears 34 60 60
IMF disbursements 259 218 120
Others 1/ 
(Net) 170 60 0
Total 575 514 694
Total Resources 1053 1129 1342 Total Uses 1053 1129 1342
Memo Items:
Per Cent Increase 
in Total Resources 7 19
Own Sources 
as per cent of 
Total Resources 45 54 57
•
iy Includes movements in short-term monetary and non-monetary capital, 
change in official reserves, and errors and omissions.
ANNEX - TABLE 19 
ERP MAJOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS (1984-89)
(Provisional)
Actual Estimates Target Projections
1984 1985
Growth Rates
GDP 8.6$ 5.1$
GDP Deflator 35.3% 31.2$
Percent of Market Price GDP
National Accounts:
Consumption 95.1 % 95.7$
Investment 7 .6% 7.3$
Private 4.0$ 3.4$
Budgetary Cap. Expenditures 3.6% 3.8$
National Savings 4.7$ 3-1$
Public -0.4$ 0.1$
Private 5.1$ 3.0$
Of which: Foreign Transfers 1.0$ 0.5$
Foreign Savings 2.8$ 4.2$
Central Government Budget:
Total Revenues 8.0$ 10.4$
Total Expenditure 11.8$ 14.1$
Recurrent 8.4$ 10.3$
Capital 3.4$ 3.8$
Special Efficiency 0.0$ 0.0$
Overall Deficit 3.8$ 3.8$
Balance of Payments
Exports of GNFS 8.0$ 9.9$
Imports of GNFS -10.7$ -12.9$
Resource Balance -2.7$ -3.0$
Current Account Balance -2.8$ -4.2$
Overall Balance -1.6$ -1.7$
Broad Money (M2) 15 12
1986 1986 1987 1988 1989
5.3$ 5.5$ 5.0$ 5 .3% 5.3$
30.2$ 18.20$ 18.0$ 12.5$ 7.5$
92.3% 95$ 89.8$ 86.7$ 85.0$
10.3$ 14$ 17.1$ 21.0$ 22.8$
4.4$ 5$ 7.9$ 11.1$ 11.9$
5.9$ 9$ 9.2$ 9.9$ 10.8$
6.6$ 6$ 8.5$ 12.2$ 14.8$
1.7$ 2$ 3.2$ 3.5$ 3.6$
4.8$ 4$ 5 .3% 8.7$ 11.2$
0.9$ 1$ 1.3$ 2.0$ 2.8$
3.7$ 7$ 8.6$ 8.8$ 7.9$
13.6$ 12$ 16.1$ 16.2$ 16.5$
17.8$ 20$ 22.8$ 23.6$ 24.4$
11.9$ 11$ 12.9$ 12.7$ 12.9$
5.9$ 6$ 9.2$ 9.9$ 10.8$
0.0$ 3$ 0.7$ 0.9$ 0.6$
4.1$ 8$ 6.6$ 7.4$ 7.9$
15.8$ 14$ 21.7$ 22.2$ 22.7$
-18.5$ -20$ -28.6$ -30.0$ -30.5$
-2.6$ -6$ -7.0$ -7.7$ -7.8$
-3.7$ -8$ -8.6$ -8.8$ -7.9$
-1.1$ +2$ 2.8$ 3.0$ 2.5$
16 15 18 20 22
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ANNEX - TABLE 20
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS: 
1960 - MID igflo's
Ghana
1. Average Life Expectancy 
at Birth
2. Infant Mortality Rate
3- Child Death Rate
4. Access to Health 
Facility (b)
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person
Per Year
6. Health Budget as 
t of GDP
7. Access to Pure Water (c)
Rural
Urban
Total
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural
Urban
Total
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a % of 
requirements
10. Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe)
11. Primary Education 
Enrolment Ratio (e)
12. Adult Literacy
13* Education Budget as 
% of GDP
14. Proportion of Population 
below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural
Urban
Late Low Income Sub-
I960 1970 1970's 1980's Saharan A frica  
(1982)
45 49 55 53 48
132 107 86 107-120 118
27 21 15 25-30 24
- - - 30 45
- - 0.7 0.4 2 (f)
. - 1.2 - 0.26 0.95
_ 14 14 48 14
- 86 86 75 62
35 35 60 22
40 40 30 25
- 92 95 65 69
55 56 44 32
92 97 88 68 91
- - 36 50-55 40
38(46) 64(75) 69(80) -(8 0 ) 69 (—)
27 30 - 35-45 44
- 3.9 - 0.85 2.81
- - 60-65 67-1 /2-
72-1/2
65
- - 30-35 45-50 35
Principal Sources: World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division,
Economic Analysis and Projections Department (June 1984), 
World Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics on 
Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); UNICEF 
Ghana: Situation Analysis of Women and Children (Jul^ 
1984).
Notes: a) i960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 between
1969 and 1971; late 1970's between 1975 and 1980; 1980's to 
1982, 1984 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. May
overstate for urban population when facilities available are
small to serve the entire population nominally within reach of 
them.
c) 1970 and late 1970's urban figures may be overstated by failing 
to relate number of water points to population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas
overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to supposed 
user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted 
figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana 
has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
f ) Estimate made by author on basis of fragmentary data.
